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THE PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 






Soldiers for hire are not a new phenomenon of the 
twenty-first century. They are as old as war itself. 
However, in the present day these modern day soldiers for 
hire are part of well-organized and competently run Private 
Military Companies (PMC). The private military industry may 
be one of the most important, but little understood 
developments in security studies to have taken place over 
the last decade. This new industry, where firms not only 
supply the goods of warfare, but also fulfill many of the 
professional functions, is not only significant to the 
defense community, but has wider ramifications for global 
policies and warfare. This study attempts to clarify and 
analyze the historical evolution of the private military 
industry, comparing different private military firms and 
their future impacts on military operations.  
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Soldiers for hire have been part of military operations 
throughout the ages. However, after the end of the Cold War 
era, the international environment transformed and a new 
form of private military actor, the Private Military Company 
(PMC) emerged. In the realm of the public domain, these new 
actors now share duties with the established state system. 
While they have many common features with soldiers for hire 
or mercenaries, they are different from old-time mercenaries 
in the way they operate their businesses. Although they are 
legitimate businesses, their morally and legally 
questionable operations have raised many dilemmas. 
To better understand these considerations, a profound 
look into the industry is required. Although numerous 
articles have been written and research conducted on the 
industry, most have been generally descriptive studies 
dealing with its legal aspects. Without understanding all 
the dynamics of the private military industry, any study 
reflecting only one aspect of it would be incomplete 
This project covers whether the growth of that industry 
is supply-push or demand-pull phenomenon. After analyzing 
this phenomenon, this project also gives an insight into the 
historical evolution of two Private Military Companies: 
Blackwater and DynCorp, and later concludes with some future 
projections related with Private Military Firms’ usage. 
The new private military phenomenon appears to be 
entrepreneurial. Starting from the end of the Cold War, many 
outside events created opportunities for the industry. PMCs 
have also sought innovative functions to diversify 
 2
themselves from the rest of the industry. Whether 
opportunities are already apparent to PMCs, or they seek new 
opportunities, the security environment still provides a 
plethora. 
The economic analyses of the industry assert that there 
are many unexploited lucrative areas for PMCs. However, 
issues of regulation, ethics, legality, and political and 
social control of force decrease the prospective growth of 
the industry. These subjects are the most mentioned areas of 
the industry. In fact, even if PMCs are generally more 
effective and less costly, the accountability of PMCs is the 
major question. In addition, the lack of accountability 
along with regulations, control and transparency of PMCs 
would have a negative impact on human rights and oversight 
responsibilities. Thus, to maintain competition and quality 
the industry should have clear mechanisms.  
As long as war exists, so will a demand for soldiers 
for hire. The private military industry would continue to 
benefit from any slack given by traditional forms of 
security. However, its emergence has raised possibilities 
and questions. History indicates that they will continue to 
play a significant role in the security environment. 
Consequently, no policy toward the private military industry 
could be effective without a clear understanding of the 
industry, its dynamics, and its challenges.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Private Military Firms (PMF) are businesses that 
provide governments with professional services intricately 
linked to warfare; they represent, in other words, the 
corporate evolution of the age-old profession of 
mercenaries. Unlike the individual dogs of war of the past, 
however, PMFs are corporate bodies that offer a wide range 
of services, from tactical combat operations and strategic 
planning to logistical support and technical assistance. 
Although recent well-publicized incidents from Abu Ghraib to 
Zimbabwe have shone unaccustomed light onto this new force 
in warfare, private military firms (PMFS) remain a poorly 
understood—and often unacknowledged—phenomenon.1 
The modern private military industry emerged at the 
start of the 1990s, driven by three dynamics: the end of the 
Cold War, transformations in the nature of warfare that 
blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a 
general trend toward privatization and outsourcing of 
government functions around the world. These three forces 
fed into each other. When the face-off between the United 
States and the Soviet Union ended, professional armies 
around the world were downsized. At the same time, 
increasing global instability created a demand for more 
troops. Warfare in the developing world also became messier—
more chaotic and less professional—involving forces ranging 
                     
1 Peter W. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” Journal of Foreign Affairs, 
(March/April 2005). 
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from warlords to child soldiers, while Western powers became 
more reluctant to intervene. Meanwhile, advanced militaries 
grew increasingly reliant on off-the-shelf commercial 
technology, often maintained and operated by private firms. 
And finally, many governments succumbed to an ideological 
trend toward the privatization of many of their functions; a 
whole raft of former state responsibilities—including 
education, policing, and the operation of prisons—were 
turned over to the marketplace. 
The PMFS that arose as a result are not all alike, nor 
do they all offer the exact same services. The industry is 
divided into three basic sectors: military provider firms 
(also known as "private security firms"), which offer 
tactical military assistance, including actual combat 
services, to clients; military consulting firms, which 
employ retired officers to provide strategic advice and 
military training; and military support firms, which provide 
logistics, intelligence, and maintenance services to armed 
forces, allowing the latter's soldiers to concentrate on 
combat and reducing their government's need to recruit more 
troops or call up more reserves. Private military companies 
have operated in more than 50 nations, on every continent 
but Antarctica.2 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this MBA Professional Report is to give 
a better understanding of the tremendous growth of the 
Private Military Industry after the Cold War. This report 
                     
2 Peter W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized 
Military Industry,” (2003).  
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gives detailed information about the factors affecting the 
phenomenal growth of that industry like whether it is a 
“Supply Push” or “Demand Pull” phenomenon or both. This 
report also gives a future projection for the growth of that 
industry. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This project tries to answer these questions: 
What factors have motivated the establishment and 
influenced the success of Private Military Firms since 1990? 
To what extent is the establishment of private military 
firms a demand-pull phenomenon? To what extent is the 
establishment of private military firms a supply-push 
phenomenon? 
After answering this question, this project considers 
the historical evolution of two Private Military Companies: 
Blackwater and DynCorp and analyze some future opportunities 
these companies may deal with. 
What is the historical evolution of two major leading 
Private Military Companies in the contemporary world? 
After answering this question, this project considers 
the future usage of Private Military Companies. 
What can be said about their usage either by states or 
by groups in coming years? What future projections about 
their scope can be made? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology of this report consists of 
three components. First is the examination of the industry 
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evolution of private military companies, including firms 
that provide consultancy and those that offer logistical and 
technological support. The second component is the analysis 
of the historical evolution of two major leading private 
military companies. The third component focuses on the usage 
of these companies in the near future and makes some future 
projections for them. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I is an overview of this MBA Professional 
Report and lays out the roadmap of the research. 
Chapter II provides a broad overview of the industry 
evolution of private military and gives an insight about 
whether this industry’s phenomenal growth is related to 
supply-push or demand-pull. 
Chapter III provides a broad overview of the historical 
evolution of Blackwater, one of the major leading Private 
Military Firms in the industry and analyzing the key factors 
that helped to the growth of that company. 
Chapter IV provides a broad overview of the historical 
evolution of DynCorp, another major leading Private Military 
Firms in the industry and analyzes the key factors the 
helped the growth of that company. 
Chapter V examines the future roles of these Private 
Military Firms and offers some potential scenarios that 
these companies might deal with. 
Chapter VI summarizes the findings and presents 
recommendations for further research and study. 
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F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The primary benefit of this report is to understand the 
dynamics of Private Military Industry. This professional 
report gathers previous research on the industry into a 
research topic that has not yet been addressed in any body 
of work to be found. The project provides a better 
understanding of the industry for future researchers as well 
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II. INDUSTRY EVOLUTION IN CONTEXT: DEMAND PULL AND 
SUPPLY PUSH FACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand the value of the development of private 
military firms, a bit of background on services and 
government responsibilities is required. In a traditional 
manner, the government provides all its citizens with 
certain services, which are generally paid through taxation. 
This occurs in what is known as the public sector. On the 
contrary, in the private sector individual citizens, now 
known as consumers, buy needed goods and services in an open 
market, paying with their own optional funds. This market is 
made up of private companies motivated by profit. Therefore, 
the distinctions between these two sectors are the nature of 
the relationship between provider and user, the sources of 
funding, and the employment status of the deliverers.3 
Occasionally governments have found it advisable to 
move some of their public responsibilities to the private 
sector. They may do so because of issues of efficiency, 
quality, cost or changing conceptions of governmental 
duties. Education, police, prisons, health care, postal 
services, garbage collection, utilities, tax collection, and 
so on are all examples of services that have been shifted 
back and forth between being viewed as fundamental public 
responsibilities of the government to something best left to 
                     
3 Elliot Sclar, Selling the Brooklyn Bridge: The Economics of Public 
Service Privatization (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1999).  
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the private market.4 The terms “privatization” and 
“outsourcing” are used interchangeably to describe this 
shift of service provision, often at the same time. 
 Nevertheless, the governments understood that the 
military—the force that protects society—was government’s 
sole responsibility, which must be carried by government 
alone. In other words, providing for the national security 
of its citizens is one of the most essential tasks of a 
government. As a result, the military has been the one area 
where there here has never been a question of states 
privatizing or outsourcing. 
The military is very different from any other 
profession and is unique specifically because it 
comprises experts in war making and in the 
organized use of violence. As professionals, 
military officers are bound by a code of ethics, 
serve a higher purpose, and fulfill a societal 
need. Their craft sets them apart from other 
professionals in that the application of military 
power is not comparable to a commercial service. 
Military professionals deal in life and death 
matters, and the application of their craft has 
potential implications for the rise and fall of 
governments.5  
However, in the course of time some of the military’s 
responsibilities were transferred to private “hands”, which 
led to the growth of Private Military Companies or PMFs. The 
end of the Cold War was a key point in the emergence of the 
privatized military industry. The consequential effect on 
the supply and demand of military services formed a 
                     
4 Ronald Coase, “The Lighthouse in Economics,” Journal of Law and 
Economics 17 (October 1974): 360-374.  
5 Bruce Grant, “U.S. Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military 
Consultants as a Tool of Foreign Policy,” National Defense University 
for National Security Studies, Strategy Essay Competition, 1998.  
 11
“security gap” that the private market rushed to fill. 
Besides that, two other necessary factors played significant 
roles and contributed to the emergence of the industry. Both 
were long-term developments that under laid the transfer of 
military services to private entities and the reopening of 
the market. The first cause was the wide transformations 
taking place in the nature of conflict itself. These have 
created new demands and new market opportunities for PMFs. 
The second factor was the “privatization revolution,” which 
provided the logic, legitimacy, and models for the entrance 
of markets into formerly state domains. The confluence of 
these momentous dynamics led to both the emergence and rapid 
growth of the privatized military industry.6 PMFs have not 
only grown up but they also have become global in both their 
scope and activities. Beginning in the 1990s, they have been 
decisive players in several conflicts, and are often the 
ultimate factor. PMFs have been active in zones of conflict 
and transition throughout the world. They have been active 
and operated on every continent but Antarctica, often with 
strategic impact on both the process and outcome of 
conflicts. They are business organizations that trade in 
professional services linked to warfare. The area of their 
specializations lays in the provision of military skills, 
including strategic planning, combat operations, 
intelligence, operational support, risk assessment, 
technical skills and training.7 
 
 
                     
6 Singer, “Corporate Warriors,” 49.  
7 Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline 
Affair (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1999), 15.  
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B. SUPPLY PUSH AND DEMAND PULL FACTORS  
“Supply and demand” is perhaps one of the 
most fundamental concepts of economics and is the backbone 
of a market economy. Demand refers to how much (quantity) of 
a product or service is desired by buyers. The quantity 
demanded is the amount of a product people are willing to 
buy at a certain price; the relationship between price and 
quantity demanded is known as the demand relationship. 
Supply represents how much the market can offer. The 
quantity supplied refers to the amount of a certain good 
that producers are willing to supply when receiving a 
certain price. The correlation between price and how much of 




Figure 1.  The demand relationship 
 
 
Price, therefore, is a reflection of supply and demand 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2). The relationship between demand and 





Figure 2.  The supply relationship 
 
 
In market economy theories, demand and supply theory 
will allocate resources in the most efficient way possible.8 
1. The End of the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War produced a vacuum in the market 
of security, which exhibited itself in numerous ways, 
feeding both the supply side and the demand side (Figure 3). 
Global threats became more diverse, more competent, and more 
dangerous, while the traditional responses to insecurity and 
conflict were at their weakest. This transformation provided 
for a larger phenomenon of state collapse and resulted in 
new areas of instability. Massive military mobilizations, in 
turn, provided a large pool of labor for the PMF industry 
and cheapening of created capital. With this vacuum, the 
firms are eager to present themselves as respectable bodies 
with a natural niche in the current, often complicated new 
world order. PMF consciously aim to fill the security void 
of the post-Cold War world.  
 
                     
8 “Economics Basics: Demand and Supply,” http://www.investopedia.com/ 
university/economics/economics3.asp (accessed 03/24/2007). 
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Figure 3.  Supply and demand diagram 
 
According to Colonel Tim Spicer, an industry executive: 
The end of the Cold War has allowed conflicts 
long suppressed or manipulated by the super 
powers to re-emerge. At the same time, most 
armies have got smaller and live footage on CNN 
of United States soldiers being killed in Somalia  
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has had staggering effects on the willingness of 
governments to commit to foreign conflicts. We 
fill the gap.9 
To better understand this phenomenon one should look at 
the rise of PMFs in terms of released conflicts, the rise of 
non-states in violence, labor, tools, and the decline of 
local state governance, local military response and outside 
intervention, and also transformations in the nature of 
warfare and the power of privatization. 
2. Released Conflicts 
The massive increase in global levels of conflict since 
the Cold War ended was one of the major forces driving the 
privatization of military services. Wars are a consequence 
of a power vacuum that is typical of transition periods in 
world affairs. While many hoped for a “new world order” of 
global peace after 1989, the real order that came about was 
that of “peace in the West, war for the rest.”10 A 
particular outgrowth was the dramatic increase in the number 
of conflicts occurring inside countries. The incidence of 
civil wars has doubled since the Cold War’s end and by the 
mid-1990s was actually five times as high as at its mid 
point. The broader number of conflict zones has roughly 
doubled.11 The result of failures of governance led to the 
conflicts and as a result opened up new spaces for private 
military actors to operate. In sum, the end of the Cold War 
removed the controls over the levels of conflict while also 
                     
9 Colonel Tim Spicer quoted in Andrew Gilligan, “Inside LT. Col. 
Spicer’s New Model Army,” Sunday Telegraph, November 22, 1998. 
10 National Defense Council Foundation, World Conflict List 2001.  
11 “Internal Conflict: Adaptation and Reaction to Globalization,” 
Cornerhouse, Briefing 12, 1999. 
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releasing unresolved anxieties and new pressures. The era 
since has seen a consequential massive increase in 
instability.  
3. The Rise of Non-States in Violence 
Regarding the rise of non-states in violence, the rapid 
change in the global security paradigm, facilitated by the 
opening of the world economy and new stateless zones, also 
led to the emergence of new conflict groups, not bound to 
any one state. The new conflict actors vary from terrorist 
organizations like al Qaeda to transnational drug cartels.
 Many of the internal conflicts that have popped up 
since the Cold War are in fact criminally related attacks on 
state sovereignty by non-state actors (for example, in 
Colombia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan). Such 
“stateless” zones not only breed greater conflict but also 
local actors whose very existence is defined by violence.12 
The growth of these non-state conflict groups shows no sign 
of reduction and the activity of these groups has opened up 
the market for PMFs both on the supply and the demand sides. 
Some firms have gone to work for non-state conflict groups, 
helping them in their mission to gain greater military 
capabilities. Rebel groups in Angola, Sierra Leone and 
international criminal organizations have all received 
military help from private companies, which have provided 
specialized military skills, such as training, and the use 
of advanced military technologies.13 Their state rivals, in 
turn, have also hired PMFs. Thus, the market for PMFs is 
                     
12 Ralf Peters, “The New Warrior Class,” Parameters 24 (Summer 1994). 
13 Andre Linard, “Mercenaries SA,” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 
1998, 31. 
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stimulated by both the appearance of non-conflict groups and 
the breakdown of the world community’s ability to normalize 
them. 
4. Labor Push 
Another major move on the international market of 
security was the flood of ex-soldiers onto the open market 
because of downsizing and the dissolution of states after 
the end of the Cold War. Thus, the private military labor 
pool for both conflict groups and private firms broadened 
and cheapened. Similar to the financial effect of changes in 
the interest rate, these developments influenced both the 
demand side and the supply side. The half-century of the 
Cold War was an historic period of hyper militarization. The 
end of it sparked a global chain of downsizing, with state 
militaries now employing roughly 7 millions fewer soldiers 
then they did in 1989. The cuts were particularly strong in 
the former Communist Bloc, as the Soviet state and many of 
its clients’ forces essentially disappeared. Most of the 
Western powers have also drastically reduced the sizes of 
their military establishments. 
The U.S. military has one third fewer soldiers than at 
its Cold War peak, while the British Army is as numerically 
small as it has been in almost two centuries (Figure 4).14 
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 Figure 4. The vacuum filled by PMF 
 
These massive demobilizations produced an oversupply of 
dislocated military skilled labor. Complete units were 
cashiered out and a number of the most elite, unsure of 
their futures, kept their structure and formed private 
companies of their own. With the reduction of state 
militaries have also come fewer opportunities for 
progression and promotion within ranks. So it was not just 
the matter of getting rid of conscripts, but also the 
downsizing of professional, careerist soldiers. The 
consequence was a sharp boost in military expertise 
available to the private sector.15 Another important feature 
of the cutbacks in state military organizations was the 
functional areas in which they took place. A great part of 
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the cuts were in back-end areas. For example, the U.S. Army 
Material Command also was reduced by 60 percent.16 However, 
power op-tempo (the frequency of military deployments) grew 
much greater than anticipated, causing a gap in the ability 
of the United States to support the increased number of its 
new post-Cold War interventions.17 This gap has been the 
beginning of the multibillion dollar military logistic 
outsourcing industry.  
5. Tools (Easy Access to Weapons) 
Military downsizing has meant that not only are trained 
military personnel excess on the world market but also that 
the resources and tools for large-scale violence have been 
brought within reach of all types of private actors. 
Enormous arms collections have become available to the open 
market. Machine guns, tanks, and even fighter jets can be 
purchased by any customer. Now many private forces have the 
most sophisticated weapons systems money can buy, including 
fighter aircraft and advanced artillery, and can even outgun 
state forces. After 1989, millions of light weapons were 
declared surplus and dumped on the world market. Much of the 
stocks ended up in the hands of arms brokers and gunrunners, 
who have no compunctions about their destination or use.18 
The consequence was that governments no longer had control 
over the main means of war, which was once key in the 
arrangement of states. Now, private conflict groups can 
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symbolize greater fears. In turn, private firms can tap the 
same arms market to build their own force capabilities, 
often in direct reaction.  
The easy availability of both sophisticated weapons 
systems and inexpensive small arms is representative of a 
broader weakening of the state in many parts of world.19 
6. The Decline of Local State Governance and Local 
Military Response 
In the developing world, an important catalyst in this 
process has been the decline in external support to weak 
states. Those states that depended on Soviet aid and support 
found this fountain dry up entirely and immediately. Foreign 
assistance from the West also fell after the end of the Cold 
War.20 Finally, there were new global macroeconomic 
strategies that had a disastrous effect on state capacity. 
In particular, structural modification led to increasing 
micro-management by contributors and the burden of 
managerial configurations that externalized much decision 
making. In sum, many states were less willing and less able 
to guarantee their own sovereign autonomy. Instead, they 
have increasingly delegated the task of securing the life 
and property of their citizens to other organizations, 
including PMFs.21 The irony is that this new wave was a 
reversal of the processes by which modern states originally 
evolved. To gain military power, regimes do not need to 
follow the old path of developing their economy or efficient 
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state institutions to tax for military forces. Rather, they 
must simply find a short-term revenue source, such as 
granting a mining concession, to pay a private actor.22 
A specific manifestation of weakened local state 
capacities was the poor condition of most militaries in the 
developing world, particularly in Africa. Many public armed 
forces were ill-trained, ill-equipped, and often 
understaffed. As a result, they often have been unable to 
guarantee the security of their country. 
In short, the principal forces of order are in 
disorder in many countries at a time when 
legitimacy of central governments and indeed 
sometimes the state is in doubt.23 
The result was that there has been an overall decay of 
state armed forces in developing regions. Given the 
increasing inadequacies of local military and security 
forces, compared to the rising challenges, it is no surprise 
that national and corporate leaders would choose to bring in 
help from whatever quarter is available, including even the 
private sphere.24 
7. Outside Intervention 
Another important factor in the opening of the military 
market for private firms was the declining willingness of 
outside powers to intervene in these more numerous outbreaks 
of violence. There were three general factors that have 
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altered the climate under which the United States and other 
major industrial powers decide whether to intervene into 
these zones.25 The vast majority of potential interventions 
were optional, in that they were not strictly about the 
intervening country’s own survival. Second, western military 
structures were still largely designed for major total 
warfare and were often inappropriate for limited 
interventions. Finally, for a variety of reasons, many of 
these states developed a marked intolerance for casualties 
suffered in conflicts that do not directly threaten the 
heart of the nation.26 In short, intervention requires the 
willingness to make real sacrifices, but such readiness is 
no longer in limitless supply. This increased the scope for 
PMFs to operate. Just like nature, the security market 
abhors a vacuum.27  
8. Transformations in the Nature of Warfare 
In the initial optimistic burst after the Cold War, it 
seemed that the UN would take over this international 
stabilizing role from the superpowers. However, operational 
disappointments in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda then acted to 
curb UN activity.28 Several factors prevented the UN from 
effectively playing a stabilizing role. First were past and 
present financial strains, primarily from member states’ 
failure to pay their dues. Second, the UN was clearly not an 
organization designed for fighting wars. The department that 
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oversees the operations in the field is highly politicized, 
underfunded, and understaffed. Its staffing process also 
results in a short supply of true military professionals 
skilled in the areas they oversee. The fact that the UN is a 
voluntary organization also acts as a straitjacket of 
sorts.29 Finally, the voluntary process also means that 
assembling and deploying a force can be painfully 
inefficient and slow. The consequence is that the UN is 
constrained in its ability to get involved properly to stop 
conflicts and stabilize zones of violence, leaving the gap 
in the market to PMFs.  
There were two underlying trends, without which 
military service privatization was unlikely to have 
occurred, despite the market opening that these shifts in 
supply and demand have created. The first of these was that 
warfare itself was undergoing revolutionary changes. The 
second was that at the high intensity level of warfare the 
requirement of advanced technology has dramatically 
increased the need for specialized expertise, which often 
must be pulled from the private sector. In sum, warfare was 
undergoing several key transformations—diversification, 
technologization, civilianization, and criminalization—each 
of which created opportunities for private military firms to 
play significant roles. 
9. The Power of Privatization 
The opportunities created for private actors in the 
wake of the post-Cold War market shift and transformations 
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in the nature of warfare were underscored by the third 
critical trend, namely the new power of privatization. The 
compared successes and failures of privatization provided 
important antecedent conditions for the growth of the 
privatized military industry. They not only shifted economic 
power, opened minds, and shattered worldviews but also 
offered important avenues for rethinking past practices.30 
In sum, the 1990s saw unprecedented levels of privatization. 
By 1998, the rate of global privatization was roughly 
doubling each year. This “privatization revolution” went 
hand in hand with globalization; both trends embraced the 
notion that comparative advantage and competition maximize 
efficiency and effectiveness.31 The privatization of 
protection, personified by PMFs, has quickly become linked 
to this expansion of market-based solutions. According to 
Mark Duffield: 
Wherever patterns of privatization have evolved, 
all have created the demand for private 
protection. Indeed, the one thing that has 
characterized the expansion of global markets in 
unstable regions is the increasing use 
sophistication of private protection to assure 
the control of assets.32 
The global trend to outsourcing also appeared in the 
corporate area. The business strategy further influenced PMF 
legitimacy and expansion. As one trade group argued, 
“Outsourcing is the new shape of business. The changes that 
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are taking place are tectonic.”33 Thus, the privatized 
military industry is just the next logical step in this 
global trend of privatization and outsourcing. It is simply 
a more aggressive manifestation of the market’s move into 
formerly state-dominated areas. As one observer opined, “If 
privatization is the trend these days, the argument goes, 
why not privatize war too?”34 
C. CONCLUSION 
The newest wave of private military firms was 
commercial enterprises first and foremost. They were 
hierarchically structured into registered businesses that 
trade and compete openly and were vertically integrated into 
the wider global marketplace. They goaled market niches by 
offering packaged services covering a broad variety of 
military skill sets. The very fact that a rational industry 
made up of these companies was identifiable provides 
evidence of their distinction.35 
The following chapters will introduce the two most 
powerful PMFs that currently act on the market and will 
examine the mechanisms that contributed to their successes. 
One should remember that PMF are the entrepreneurs. In other 
words, they are opportunity scouts, and they sniff out 
opportunities. The whole idea is the perception of 
opportunity. They perceive an opportunity to start a firm in  
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this area and they pursue that opportunity. Having that in 
mind, the next chapters reveal the secrets of the most 
















III. HISTORICAL INDUSTRY EVOLUTION OF BLACKWATER 
COMPANY 
A. MILESTONES TO BLACKWATER 
Blackwater USA is a private military company (PMC) and 
security firm founded in 1996 by Erik Prince and based in 
North Carolina. The company describes itself as a "military, 
law enforcement, security, peacekeeping, and stability 
operations company."36 Their military activities are for-
hire, meeting the definition of foreign mercenaries. 
In 1965, the Prince Family founded a company that made 
die-cast machines for the auto industry in Michigan; by 
1969, the company was producing an aluminum transmission 
case every two minutes.37 By 1973, Prince Corporation was a 
great success, with hundreds of people working for the 
company’s various Holland county divisions.38 By 1980, 
Prince Corporation boasted numerous plants and more than 550 
employees.39 As Erik Prince later recalled,  
My dad (Edgar Prince) was a very successful 
entrepreneur. From scratch he started a company 
that first produced high-pressure die-cast 
machines and grew into a world class automotive 
parts supplier in west Michigan. They developed 
and patented the first lighted car sun visor, 
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developed the car digital compass/thermometer and 
the programmable garage door opener.40 
In the 1980s, the Prince family merged with one of the 
most venerable conservative families in the United States 
when Erik Prince’s sister Betsy married Dick Devos, whose 
father, Richard founded the multilevel marketing firm Amway 
and went on to own the Orlando Magic basketball team.41 The 
company would rise to become one of the greatest corporate 
contributors in the U.S. electoral process in the 1990s, 
mostly to Republican candidates and causes, and used its 
business infrastructure as a massive political organizing 
network.42  
On March 2, 1995 Edgar Prince, founder of the Prince 
Manufacturing Co. died of a heart attack. At the time of his 
father’s death, Erik Prince was a Navy SEAL serving a string 
of deployments in Bosnia, Haiti, and the Middle East. Due to 
his father’s death, a full-time career as a SEAL was no 
longer an option for Erik Prince. He assumed active 
management of the family business. On July 22, 1996, little 
more than a year after Edgar’s death, the family agreed to 
sell the corporation to Johnson Controls for $1.35 billion 
in cash.43 
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B.  DEMAND PULL FOR PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AND BLACKWATER 
BEGINS 
1.  What Erik Prince, Founder of Blackwater, Thinks 
about Private Military Firms and What is Their 
Significance? 
Erik Prince during an interview with the “The-Virginian 
Pilot”, “As I trained all over the world, I realized how 
difficult it was for units to get the cutting-edge training 
they needed to ensure success. In a letter to home while I 
was deployed, I outlined the vision that is today 
Blackwater.”44  
For Erik Prince, Blackwater is not only a company, but 
also a partner to the DoD and all government agencies, and 
Blackwater stands ready to provide surge capacity, training, 
security and operational services in various areas at their 
request.45 He emphasizes the significance of Private 
Military Companies (PMC) and Blackwater with these words:  
American history details the contributions of 
private contractors in the development of our 
Nation. Examples include the Jamestown, Plymouth, 
and Massachusetts Bay colonies; all started as 
private investment endeavors whose security was 
provided by PMCs. Across the street from the 
White House is Lafayette Park; on its four 
corners stand statues of Lafayette, Von Steuben, 
Rochambeau, and Kosciusko. All were foreign 
professional military officers that came here to 
help build and develop the capacity of the 
Continental Army. The base of one of the statues 
bears the inscription: “He gave military training 
and discipline to the citizen soldiers who 
achieved the independence of the United States.” 
                     




Lewis and Clark’s expedition to explore the 
American West consisted of some active duty 
soldiers but their “Corps of Discovery” crew also 
consisted of what would now be considered 
contractors.46 
According to Erik Prince, the economics for that 
industry and its cost effectiveness for the government to 
outsource these functions are:  
[T]he private sector are able rapidly to tailor a 
custom solution to solve the customer’s problem. 
Our ability to quickly react with a right-sized 
solution whose entire cost is only associated 
with the duration of the contract is cost-
effective because there are no subsequent 
carrying costs like salary, medical care, 
retirement, etc.47  
My family’s business was automotive supply, one 
of the most efficient and globally competitive in 
the world. You wake up in the morning having to 
drive efficiency throughout the organization or 
you will be driven under. We strive for that 
level efficiency in what we do today. In very 
competitive industries, the purchasing/contract 
officers understand your business as well as you 
do. The government can ensure good value for the 
taxpayer by pushing that level of competence and 
accountability to its purchasing agents and 
contracting officers too.48 
2.  Blackwater Begins 
Erik Prince founded Blackwater in 1996. The company’s 
name was inspired by the black waters of the Great Dismal 
Swamp close to where Blackwater was constructed. At its 
                     





founding, the company largely consisted of Prince's private 
fortune and a vast 5,000-acre plot of land located near the 
Great Dismal Swamp in Moyock, North Carolina. 
 Its vision was "to fulfill the anticipated demand for 
government outsourcing of firearms and related security 
training."49 When Erik Prince appealed to the plan 
commissionaires, his project was described as a “$2 million 
outdoor shooting range.”50 The company had spent its first 
three years struggling for an identity, paying staff with an 
executive’s credit card and begging for customers.51 From 
1998 until 2000, only six people worked in the training 
department, and Prince often had to pay from his own pocket 
just to make payroll.52 
In many ways, the Blackwater project couldn’t have come 
at a better time. Blackwater was born just as the military 
was in the midst of a massive, unprecedented privatization 
drive that had begun in force from 1989 to 1993. From 1989 
to 1993, the military budget shrank $10 billion and the 
number of troops dropped from 2.2 million to 1.6 million. 
The idea of privatization related with DoD was to free up 
the troops to fight while private contractors handled the 
backend logistics. 
By the time Al Clark, Erik Prince, and a handful of 
others began serious planning for what would become 
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Blackwater in the mid-1990s, the military had been 
downsizing for years, and training facilities were among the 
casualties of that trend. This downsizing would provide 
fertile ground for Blackwater to sprout and grow fast.53 
“There was a need for training for military and for Special 
Operations units, because most of the ranges and facilities 
were World War II and they were antiquated,” said Bill 
Masciangelo, the first president of Blackwater, who added, 
“Since they were running out of places to train, and nobody 
provided a modern military facility, that was the whole 
concept behind Blackwater when it was first conceived.”54    
At the same time, there was a growing trend toward 
privatization of government functions. The result is a $100-
billion-a-year global business.55 
By 1998, Blackwater was doing a brisk business in 
training private and government customers in the use of a 
wide variety of weapons from pistols to precision rifles to 
machine guns. It was leasing out the facility to SEALs for 
their training. Police officers from Virginia, North 
Caroline, and Canada had enrolled in Blackwater training 
programs, and the company was starting to get inquiries from 
foreign governments.56 By the late 1998, Blackwater boasted 
a nine-thousand square-foot lodge with conference rooms, 
classrooms, lounge, pro-shop, and dining hall. A wide  
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variety of ranges, including an urban street façade and a 
pond for water-to-land training were just some of the early 
offerings.57 
One turning point in Blackwater’s corporate evolution 
came with the October 2000 suicide bombing of the Norfolk-
based destroyer U.S.S. Cole. The al-Qaeda terrorist attack, 
in the port of Aden, killed 17 sailors. The Cole bombing 
settled the company’s internal debate: Blackwater would quit 
foraging for civilian business and start going after federal 
contracts. 
“We were at about 20-something employees,” Blackwater’s 
President Gary Jackson said. “The Cole was bombed, and the 
Navy did a bottom-up review and looked at their processes, 
their procedures, their tactics, and they found out that 
there were some glaring holes. The young sailor was not 
getting the training with live firearms. They lost most of 
their firearms instructors so they called us up and asked us 
if we could train up to 20,000 students in a prescribed 
amount of time and I said ‘Sure.’ And we did it.”58   
To date, Blackwater has trained some 30,000 sailors.59 
Blackwater was officially awarded the $35.7 million Navy 
contract for “force protection training that includes force 
protection fundamental training.60 
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On February 1, 2000, Blackwater took its first contract 
with the General Services Administration, creating a 
government-approved list of services and goods Blackwater 
could sell to federal agencies.  
Erik Prince recruited former CIA operative Jamie Smith 
in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. Smith saw a market in hiring 
out men skilled in State Department style personal 
protection skills and wanted to create a division that had 
potential as a growth industry. It was not until after 9/11 
that Prince became fully committed to the idea.61  
The second turning point was September 11 attacks. 
Within months, as the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and began 
planning the Iraq invasion, Blackwater Security was already 
turning a profit, pulling in hundreds of thousands a month 
from a CIA contract.62 The company’s work for the CIA and 
the military after Smith’s and Prince’s political and 
military connections would provide Blackwater with important 
leverage in wooing what would become its largest confirmed 
client, the U.S. State Department.63 Prince’s timing was 
calculated, since CIA security resources were soon spread 
thin. Six months after 9/11, the CIA’s security division was 
overstretched, and they needed protection for their newly 
established Kabul station. After Prince called seeking 
opportunities for his new business venture, Blackwater 
obtained a $5.4 million, six-month contract that was 
specified as “urgent and compelling” necessity.64    
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Almost overnight following September 11, the company 
would become a central player in a global war. "I've been 
operating in the training business now for four years and 
was starting to get a little cynical on how seriously people 
took security," Prince told Fox News host Bill O'Reilly 
shortly after 9/11.65 It got even better in March 2003, when 
President Bush expanded the “global war on terror” to Iraq, 
providing more fuel for Blackwater’s fast rise. 
C. BLACKWATER IN WAR ZONES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
1.  Guarding Paul Bremer in Baghdad, Innovations and 
Gold Rush Effect 
In mid-April 2003, Paul Bremer was offered to the job 
of head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad 
after the invasion of Iraq and started his job in May 
2003.66 On August 28, 2003 Blackwater contracted with a 
sole-source and no-bid contract to provide personnel 
security to Bremer. The amount of the contract was $27.7 
million and it was Blackwater’s starting point in Iraq.67   
“Standard wages for PSD (personal security detail) pros 
(In Iraq) were previously running about $300 a day,” Fortune 
magazine reported. Once Blackwater started recruiting for 
its first big job, guarding Paul Bremer, the rate increased 
to $600 a day. Blackwater described its Bremer project as a 
“turnkey security package.” In response, Blackwater 
developed an innovative combat PSD program to ensure 
Ambassador Bremer’s safety and that of any ambassador who 
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followed. The company provided him with thirty-six 
“personnel protection” specialists, two K-9 teams, and three 
MD-530 Boeing helicopters with pilots to taxi him around the 
country.68  
The Bremer contract had officially elevated Blackwater 
to a special status in the war on terror and opened many 
doors in the world of private military contracting. The 
firm’s performance in guarding Bremer can be viewed from the 
perspective of free-market economy—that is, if you want to 
earn more money you have to protect your primary in any 
case. For the military, if the primary gets killed, that is 
a very bad thing but nobody is going to go out of business. 
For a private company like Blackwater, the death of the 
primary can mean the death of the business itself. That is 
why Blackwater’s marketing campaign during this time was: 
“if we can protect the most hated man in Iraq, we can 
protect anyone, anywhere.”69  
2. Supply Push Factors for Blackwater and Other PMFs 
The Times of London said, “In Iraq, the postwar 
business boom is not oil. It is security.” In Iraq 
Blackwater, with its former Special Forces operators and 
political connections billed some clients $1500 to $2,000 
per man per day, according to Time magazine.70 
Around the time Blackwater won its Bremer contract, 
PMFs quickly poured into Iraq. Firms like Control Risks 
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Group, DynCorp, Erinys, Aegis, ArmorGroup, Hart, Kroll, and 
Steele Foundation, many of which already had some presence 
in the country, began deploying thousands of hired guns in 
Iraq and recruiting internationally. When Bremer left Iraq 
in June 2004, there were more than twenty thousand private 
soldiers inside the country’s borders and Iraq had become 
the real lab for the future of PMFs. According to The 
Economist magazine, the Iraqi occupation shot British 
military companies’ revenues up from $320 million before the 
war to more than $1.6 billion by early 2004, “making 
security by far Britain’s most lucrative postwar export to 
Iraq.”71 
The privatization of the occupation in Iraq also 
offered a chance for many combat enthusiasts, retired from 
the service and stuck in the ennui of everyday existence, to 
return to their glory days on the battlefield under the 
banner of the international fight against terrorism. Dan 
Boelens, a fifty-five-year–old police officer from Michigan 
and self-described weapons expert, went to Iraq with 
Blackwater because it was “the last chance in my life to do 
something exciting,” saying, “I like the stress and 
adrenaline push it gives me.”72 
“When a guy can make more money in one month than he 
can make all year in the military or a civilian job, it’s 
hard to turn it down,” says ex SEAL Dale McClellan, one of 
the original founders of Blackwater USA.73 
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Many Special Forces soldiers who served in the 
“peacetime” of the 1990s also felt robbed of the overt 
combat of different eras and viewed the war on terror as 
their chance at glory. Another ex-SEAL, Curtis Williams 
says, “We are trained to serve in our country in an elite 
fashion; We went to go back and kill the bad guy. It is who 
we are.”74   
Blackwater’s Gary Jackson bragged shortly before the 
notorious Fallujah killings, “We have grown 300 percent over 
each of the past three years, we have a very small niche 
market, and we work towards putting out the cream of the 
crop, the best.”75 
3. Fallujah Ambush and Effects on Iraq’s Invasion 
The U.S. occupation of Fallujah began in April 2003, 
one month following the beginning of the invasion. Fallujah 
was one of the most peaceful areas of the country just after 
the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the arrival of U.S. soldiers 
was received peacefully. There was very little looting and 
the new mayor of the city Taha Bidaywi Hamed, selected by 
local tribal leaders—was pro-American.76 
On the evening of April 28, 2003, several hundred 
residents defied the Coalition curfew and marched down the 
streets of Fallujah, past the soldiers positioned in the 
Ba'ath party headquarters, to protest the Coalition's 
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presence outside a local school. A U.S. Army Psychological 
Operations team attempted to make the crowd disperse with 
announcements, but failed. According to locals, at this 
point the U.S. military fired upon the unarmed crowd. 
According to the soldiers on the ground, the 82nd airborne 
soldiers inside the school responded to "effective fire" 
from inside the protesting crowd. Reportedly, 17 protesters 
were killed while the U.S. suffered no casualties from the 
incident.77  
Approximately one year after the invasion, the city's 
Iraqi police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps were still unable 
to establish law and order. Insurgents launched attacks on 
police stations in the city killing 20 police officers. 
On March 31, 2004, four men working for Blackwater USA 
as security guards—Scott Helvenston, Wesley Batalona, Jerry 
Zovko and Michael Teague—were ambushed by insurgents in 
Fallujah. They were killed, their bodies burned and 
mutilated, and two were strung up on a bridge over the 
Euphrates. The insurgents made their own video of the 
attack, broadcasting the images around the world. Almost 
overnight, the issue of private contractors in Iraq was put 
on the map. The Marines in charge of the area didn't know 
the Blackwater team would be traveling that day into the 





                     




ordered to invade the city and find the killers; this was 
not the original plan they had had for quelling the 
insurgency in the area.78  
The Blackwater mission was to provide security for 
trucks belonging to a food caterer, ESS. The empty trucks 
were being sent to pick up kitchen equipment from the 82nd 
Airborne. But the Blackwater men were uneasy. One team 
member, former Army Ranger Wes Batalona, complained to a 
friend that the team had never worked together before. 
Furthermore, Blackwater was contractually obligated to 
supply two SUVs with three guards per vehicle. Instead, the 
men set out that morning with just two men per car, each 
short a rear gunner.79 
After the Fallujah attack, the lid of Pandora’s Box was 
opened for all Private Military Firms, Private Security 
Companies and Private Military Support Firms. In addition to 
the discussions about their lack of legitimacy, their 
oversight and accountability and human right violations in 
Iraq, it also affected the command and control issues on the 
battlefield. 
Iraq can easily be described as a complex battle space 
where military forces, civilian U.S. government agencies, 
international organizations, contractors, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) and the local population all share the 
same ground. The private security company is now added to 
that complex battle space in today’s warfare. 
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One of the major fallouts of this complex battle space 
is the number of “blue on white” incidents that are 
occurring in Iraq. A blue on white incident is a term that 
is used by both the military and private security companies 
to describe an incident in which the military (blue) fires 
at a friendly private security contractor (white). When the 
term is reversed (white on blue), it describes the incident 
where a private security contractor fires on a military 
unit.80 Some private security contractors believe that they 
receive fire from the military without provocation due to 
new troops rotating to the region and not being familiar 
with the roles and missions of the private security 
contractors in supporting reconstruction efforts.81 
4.  Post Paul Bremer Period for Blackwater 
For Blackwater, the Bremer contract in Iraq was 
undoubtedly a valuable reference. It was prestigious and an 
invaluable marketing tool to win more clients and high-value 
government contracts. The company could boast that the U.S. 
government had entrusted it with the protection of its most 
senior officials on Washington’s hottest front line in the 
“war on terror.”  
In June 2004, at the end of Bremer’s tenure, Blackwater 
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government contracts on the market, through the State 
Department’s Worldwide Personal Protective Service (WPPS) 
program.82 
The WPPS contract was divided among a handful of well-
connected PMFs, among them DynCorp and Triple Canopy. 
Blackwater was originally to be paid $229.5 million for five 
years, according to a State Department contract list. As of 
June 30, 2006, just two years into the program, it had been 
paid a total of $321,715,794.83 
In an interview, Erik Prince clarified the phenomenal 
growth of Blackwater and the private security industry due 
to a few simple, but important factors: “Delivering services 
complete, correct, and on time, and continue to attract 
committed professionals who value service over self and who 
want to have an immediate positive impact for customers.”84 
For Erik Prince, growth in this industry is not restricted 
to Iraq alone. Because of the demand, the companies who have 
continually invested for the long term will be the companies 
who are looked at to provide services whenever they are 
needed.85 
As with Halliburton, the Pentagon’s largest contractor, 
Blackwater is set apart from simple war profiteers by the 
defining characteristic of its executive’s very long view. 
They have not just seized a profitable moment along with 
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many of their competitors but have set out to carve a 
permanent niche for themselves for decades to come. 
Blackwater’s aspirations are not limited to international 
wars, however. Its forces beat most federal agencies to New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, as hundreds of 
heavily armed Blackwater personnel—some fresh from 
deployment in Iraq—fanned out into the disaster zone. Within 
a week, they were officially hired by the Department of 
Homeland Security to operate in the U.S. Gulf, billing the 
federal government $950 a day per Blackwater soldier.86 
The president of Blackwater, Gary Jackson, states his 
future vision as, “[That our] military is doing a fabulous 
job in fighting the war on terrorism is apparent by the 
results of the most recent victory in the Battle of 
Fallujah. As Iraq continues to become more stable the 
Department of State will be sending in more U.S. Government 
Officials to assist Iraq in becoming a democracy. These 
Officials need professional protection and the Department of 
State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security has chosen and 
contracted Blackwater Security Consulting to assist their 
organization in providing that protection.”87 
D. BLACKWATER AVIATION AND BLACKWATER AT THE CASPIAN SEA 
1. Blackwater Aviation 
Blackwater aviation was born in April 2003, as the Iraq 
occupation was getting underway, when Prince Group acquired 
Aviation Worldwide Services (AWS) and its subsidiaries, 
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including Presidential Airways.88 The AWS consortium had 
been brought together in early 2001 under the ownership of 
Tim Childery and Richard Pere, who focused on military 
training operations and aviation transport for the U.S. 
government. Presidential Airways was the licensed air 
carrier and provided CASA 212 and Metro 23 aircraft for 
military training contracts, including some for the U.S. 
Special Operations Command.89  
In addition to offering solutions for firearms 
training, steel targets and range construction, and security 
needs, Blackwater now offers aviation and logistical 
solutions for its customers with the strategic goal of 
providing a “one stop” solution for its customer’s security 
and tactical training needs. 
Blackwater also began developing a surveillance blimp 
that could be used to spy on “enemy” forces abroad or by the 
Department of Homeland Security to monitor the border.90 
In 2004, Blackwater announced plans to move the 
operations of its aviation division to North Carolina and in 
2006 sought approval to build a private airstrip with two 
runways for its fleet of more than twenty planes.91 
2. Blackwater in the Caspian Sea Region 
The United States’ strategic interest in petroleum 
reserves certainly did not begin with the 1991 Persian Gulf 
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War or the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq. While Iraq and 
the war on the terror have dominated the headlines, the U.S. 
government and American corporate interests have long been 
quietly engaged in a parallel campaign to secure the Caspian 
Sea region, which is believed to house well over 100 billion 
barrels of oil.92  
Two powerful nations—Russia and Iran—also border the 
Caspian Sea and view the U.S. incursion into the area as a 
hostile threat. American oil companies including Amoco, 
Unocal, Exxon, and Pennzoil have invested billions of 
dollars in Azerbaijan and plan to invest billions more. The 
list of private American citizens who are seeking to make 
money from Azerbaijani oil or to encourage investment are 
former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and James A. 
Baker III, former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, former 
Senator and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, former White 
House chief of staff John H. Sununu, and two national 
security advisers, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.93   
In May 2001, Dick Cheney’s energy task force estimated 
that proven oil reserves in Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s 
sectors of the Caspian alone equaled “about 20 billion 
barrels.”94 
The Cheney Group estimated that if the United States 
could get a major pipeline flowing West from the Caspian 
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Sea—away from Moscow’s control—daily exports from the 
Caspian Sea to world markets could go as high as 2.6 million 
barrels per day by 2005.95 
The Bush administration knew that the controversial 
pipeline would need to be protected in each country it 
passed through. While Washington increased its military aid 
to Georgia, it faced a decade-long U.S. Congressional ban on 
military assistance to Azerbaijan, where the oil would be 
extracted.    
Beginning in July 2004, Blackwater forces were 
contracted to work in Azerbaijan, where they would quietly 
train a force modeled after the Navy SEALs and establish a 
base at the north of the Iranian border as part of a major 
U.S. strategy in the region.96 Instead of sending in 
battalions of active U.S. military to Azerbaijan, the 
Pentagon deployed “civilian contractors” from Blackwater and 
other firms to set up an operation that would serve a dual 
purpose: protecting the West’s new oil and securing gas 
deals in a region historically dominated by Russia and Iran. 
In strategically important Baku, Blackwater renovated a 
Soviet-era maritime special operations training facility 
that Pentagon planners envisioned as a command center 
modeled on those used by the Department of Homeland 
Security.97 
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E. BLACKWATER TODAY AND STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 
FUTURE 
1. Blackwater Today 
The company advertises itself as “the most 
comprehensive professional military, law enforcement, 
security, peacekeeping, and stability operations company in 
the world.”98 According to the company’s website, it is 
comprised of nine separate business units, and has strategic 
relationships with Aviation Worldwide Services and Greystone 
Ltd.:99  
• Blackwater Training Center, the largest private 
firearms and tactical training center in the U.S. 
and the company’s original focus, 
• Blackwater Target Systems, a department offering 
shooting range target systems, 
• Blackwater Security Consulting, a risk analysis 
and training service, which also supplies clients 
with mobile security teams of former members of 
special operations units,  
• Blackwater Canine, a dog-training unit,  
• Maritime Security, 
• Manufacturing of custom Armored Vehicles, 
• Parachute Jump Team, 
• Aviation, 
• Raven Development Group, an expanded service for 
building secure facilities.   
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These business units have the following 
capabilities:100 
• A logistics operation that can deliver 100- and 
200-ton self-contained humanitarian relief 
response packages, 
• A Florida aviation division with 26 different 
platforms, including helicopter gunships, Boeing 
767, and a Zeppelin, 
• The largest tactical driving track in the US, 
• A 20-acre manmade lake with shipping containers, 
• A K-9 training facility with 80 dog teams deployed 
around the world, 
• A 1,200-yard-long firing range, 
• A large private armory, including Berettas, Glocks 
and Sig Sauers, 
• An urban armored vehicle development program 
called the Grizzly. 
As the company continued to see training as its core 
business function, in 2004 it made major upgrades to its 
facilities by receiving permission from Currituck County to 
expand its facilities into that county. New facilities 
include firearms ranges, parachute landing zones, and 
explosives training areas. Later, “Blackwater began to build 
a roadway through 90 acres of its property that would be 
suitable for training in high-speed chases (above 100 miles 
per hour) as well as motorcade protection against terrorist 
attacks.”101 
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In March 2006, Blackwater suggested at an international 
conference that a brigade-size force was ready to move into 
a troubled region for humanitarian efforts and low intensity 
conflicts.102  
In November 2006, the company announced its plans to 
open a new training site in Illinois, to be known as 
Blackwater North. It would have seven flat ranges, one each 
known- and unknown-distance ranges, and a climbing tower.103 
In 2007, during the State of the Union Speech, 
President Bush mentioned an initiative that would help the 
U.S. forces in response, in reconstruction and in war: 
Civilian Reserve Corps. The proposed Corps was not his idea 
alone. Erik Prince, the mega-millionaire owner of Blackwater 
had a privatized version of the concept. In early 2005, 
Prince announced the idea at a military conference of a 
‘contractor brigade’ as an addition to the official 
military, but with a lower price tag.104   
2. Strategic Alternatives for the Future 
As long as war exists, so will a demand for military 
expertise. PMFs will resultantly benefit from any slack 
given by traditional sources of security not only on the 
battlefield but also in many different business lines where  
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PMFs can operate. Blackwater, in addition to business lines 
it currently operates, can exploit those new revenue 
streams, as well: 
• Humanitarian Relief Effort (As in the case of 
Hurricane Katrina). Blackwater already offered its 
services to the California Department of Homeland 
Security for California Disaster relief 
contracts.105 Blackwater states in its official 
website that: ”Blackwater can provide a wide range 
of consulting, manpower, and material support in 
response to humanitarian events worldwide to 
include: Disaster planning and evaluation of 
disaster plans, mobility and logistics planning 
and evaluation of standing support plans, 
establishment of crisis management centers in 
support of disaster event, Personnel augmentation 
in support of standing aide organizations.”106 
 
• United Nations Peacekeeping operations all over 
the world. Blackwater officials say they can help 
keep peace in Darfur. Doug Brooks runs an 
association of private military firms, which 
includes Blackwater, and says his members can help 
where governments have failed.  
 "What we've seen is the West has largely abrogated 
any responsibility to put their own people on the 
ground in places they don't care about," says 
                     
105 Interview with the author of “Blackwater” Jeremy Scahill. 
106 Blackwater Official Website, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ 
securityconsulting/Human_Support.asp (accessed 05/07/2007). 
 51
Brooks. "It's willing to authorize these missions, 
but it's not willing to put boots on the ground. 
The private sector can step in. It can fill that 
gap.”107 
• Manufacturing & Service: Blackwater, with the 
experience it has gained from war zones, now 
offers its newly manufactured armored personnel 
carrier, called the “Grizzly”. Blackwater touts 
the Grizzly on its official web site: “The leader 
in the high-threat security industry, Blackwater 
incorporates real-world lessons learned on the 
streets of Iraq and Afghanistan into all of our 
operations.  Now, we’ve gone one step further. 
Blackwater presents the GRIZZLY – the world’s only 
Armored Personnel Carrier intended to counter the 
most lethal threats in the modern urban combat 
environment.”108  
• Spare Parts supply related to manufacturing. 
• Providing infrastructure security and executive 
protection for Fortune 500 companies against 
terrorist attacks. 
• Providing energy pipeline security around the 
world, especially in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia 
and Middle East regions. 
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 F. BLACKWATER’S COMPETITORS 
1. DynCorp 
DynCorp International LLC has its origins with two 
companies formed in 1946: Land-Air, Inc. and California 
Eastern Airways. In 1998, DynCorp established DynCorp 
Technical Services, Inc. (DTS) and transferred its existing 
aerospace and international-division business—including 
contracts later held by DynCorp International—to the new DTS 
subsidiary. 
DynCorp also operates in the field of Aerospace, 
Logistics, Law Enforcement and Security, Infrastructure, 
Maritime, and Contingency. At their official web site, they 
declare that DynCorp International can deploy law 
enforcement and security personnel anywhere at virtually a 
moment’s notice and use a database of more than 3,000 
qualified individuals, so they have an unmatched ability to 
recruit and assemble large security contingents.109 
2. Triple Canopy 
Founded in September 2003 by Thomas Katis, Matthew Mann 
and John Peters, Triple Canopy grew to over 800 employees 
and earned annual revenues exceeding $100 million within its 
first year of operation. They explain their extraordinary 
achievement as due in part to their carefully selected 
management team.110 According to their official web site: 
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The dynamic combination of our unparalleled 
operational leadership comprised of former 
operators from tier-one special operations units 
and a proven executive management team has 
accelerated growth and enabled us to set the 
standard for security solutions. The name Triple 
Canopy was initially chosen to evoke the 
protection offered by a "triple canopy" jungle. 
We still embrace that idea but further define 
ourselves by the multiple layers of security we 
offer as well as the levels of redundancy built 
into every operation.111 
Triple Canopy, one of the leading actors among Private 
Military Firms, also states its mission and vision at its 
official web site:    
Legal, moral and ethical business practices have 
always been a cornerstone of Triple Canopy's 
philosophy. We firmly believe that honesty and 
integrity in all we do best serves our clients 
and society. 
Vision 
To be the global market leader, providing our 
clients with premier integrated security 
solutions while setting the conduct and 
performance standards for our industry. 
Mission 
Triple Canopy provides legal, moral and ethical 
security solutions enabling our clients to excel 
globally in challenging environments.112 
 
                     




Another major player in the industry is CACI, a company 
that has been in existence for some time. 
Caci was founded in July of 1962 by two extraordinary 
individuals: Herb Karr, a practical and visionary 
businessman, and Harry Markowitz, a programming genius. 
These entrepreneurs took an unsupported public domain 
software language, realized it presented a promising 
business opportunity and created a company to train and 
support its users. In a very short time Herb and Harry went 
from doing business on a park bench to launching a 
successful venture in the nascent computer industry.113 
CACI describes its historical evolution as: 
Following the trend lines, building on legacy 
expertise and delivering quality client service 
became hallmarks of CACI’s evolving culture. And 
these ideals served as well in the 1980s, when we 
encountered a dramatic change in the federal 
landscape. As new rules and regulations went into 
effect we had to retool our business to succeed 
in a now competitive environment. We adapted, 
survived and, thanks to our solid business 
philosophies and culture, continued to succeed. 
In the '90s we really took off, changing from a 
professional services firm to an IT solutions 
provider. We recognized that IT was shifting from 
individual software applications to networks and 
enterprise-wide projects... and it was clear it 
would soon be a "network world." 
Today, even in a period of economic uncertainty, 
CACI's fiscal performance remains outstanding. 
Our stock value continues to rise and for fiscal 
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year 2006 we announced record revenues of $1.76B. 
We maintain an aggressive acquisition strategy - 
34 acquisitions in 14 years - to augment our core 
competencies by adding talented new people and 
powerful new capabilities. CACI now fields a 
force of approximately 10,000 employees across 
more than 130 offices around the world. 
CACI takes great pride in our record of 
achievement. The secret of our success is no 
secret at all... our culture effectively provides 
the foundation for our achievements. Hiring and 
rewarding good people, predicting and acting on 
technology trends, dealing openly and honestly 
with our clients and delivering the best products 
and services... these remain our focus, our 
strategy and our guide to success.114 
4. Gurkha Personal Security Company 
Gurkhas are well known throughout the world for their 
professionalism, dedication, discipline, loyalty, integrity 
and courage in the face of danger. The majority have served 
on average 20 years with the British Army, stationed 
worldwide. They adapt to any culture, environment or society 
where they are called upon to serve. 
When the British East India Company tried to expand 
their trade routes into Nepal and beyond, they encountered 
the Gurkhas. They got their name from the Gurkha district of 
Nepal. These hill men fought the British Army over a number 
of years, and their respect for each other grew. The British 
were so impressed by their fighting skills that it was 
suggested that the Gurkha hill men should be recruited into 
the Army to form new Battalions made up entirely from their 
numbers. In March 1816, a treaty was signed signaling a 
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cessation of hostilities. In April of the same year, 
authorization to form the first Battalion of Gurkha recruits 
took place. 
The Gurkhas have been part of the British Army for 
nearly 200 years. During that time, they have fought in 
every major theatre of war, from the first Afghan war 
through to Bosnia, the Falklands and more recently Iraq. 
They have received in all 6,500 decorations for bravery, 
including 13 Victoria Cross awards. 
Gurkha Security Company describes itself in its 
official web site as: 
Gurkha Security (UK) Ltd prides itself in 
providing professional Gurkhas who have served in 
the British Army and can offer Personal Security, 
Protection and Professional Bodyguard Services. 
 
Our Gurkha Personal Security Program will ensure 
the protection requirements of your situation are 
carefully assessed and the relevant Gurkha 
Security program is put in place. 
 
Many of our Gurkhas have undertaken Bodyguard 
Services and have provided Professional Security 
Services to a wide range of clients. 
The role of the company is to supply Gurkhas, who 
are trained to the very highest standards, to 
clients who require professional personal 
security or the services of personal security 
guards. We also provide protection consultancy. 
As Martin Rea, the Director of Operations 
explained "many of our Gurkhas have undertaken 
positions such as providing Close Protection for 
the Prime Minister of the State of Qatar, we also 
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IV. HISTORICAL INDUSTRY EVOLUTION OF DYNCORP 
COMPANY 
A. OVERVIEW 
DynCorp International is a complex, global enterprise 
that provides inventive solutions to the various 
technological and professional services needs of government 
and commercial industry worldwide. While they are a highly 
successful provider of critical support to military and 
civilian government institutions, they also have significant 
commercial business in aviation, infrastructure development, 
security, and logistics, including international projects to 
build and administer regional air facilities.116 DynCorp is 
based in Falls Church, VA and its current president and CEO is 
Stephen J. Cannon. DynCorp is owned by Computer Sciences 
Corporation (CSC) who paid $950 million for it. CSC’s 
clients include the following: General Dynamics, BAE 
SYSTEMS, Chevron Corp., DuPont, MIT – Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Nortel Networks, Raytheon, Siemens, 
U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. NASA Goddard SFC. CSC is 
one of the top 20 corporations to do work for the US 
government.117 
DynCorp’s roots are in aviation. In 1951, their 
precursor, Land-Air, Inc., implemented the first Contract 
Field Teams, by which they deployed teams of technicians to 
the field to maintain military aircraft. They have held the 
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Contract Field Teams contract continuously since then, and 
currently maintain rotary and fixed-wing aircraft for all 
branches of the U.S. Armed Forces throughout the world, for 
foreign governments flying American aircraft, and for 
commercial aviation. The company provides unique 
capabilities to U.S. and foreign governments. DynCorp is a 
provider of over 90% of services under the Civilian Police 
(CIVPOL) program for the Department of State and also the 
single supplier of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL) Eradication services to the Department of 
State. 
Moreover, it is the largest provider of Contract Field 
Team (CFT) services to the Department of Defense. In recent 
years, DynCorp International has expanded its scope to 
program management and security. Previously, they have 
recruited, trained, and deployed more than 5,000 highly-
qualified civilian peacekeepers and police trainers to 11 
countries, including Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 
for the Department of State.118 To better understand the 
scope of DynCorp’s activities it is necessary to look at the 
DynCorp clients. These are the Department of State, 
Department of Defense, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, 
U.S. Marine Corps, NATO, and Armed Forces of The United 
Kingdom, Government of Nigeria, Australian Defense Force, 
Kuwaiti Air Force and Department of Homeland Security.119 
DynCorp International has a highly efficient global 
recruiting network that recruits skilled professionals and 
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technicians worldwide. Currently, they have nearly 14,000 
employees in more than 30 countries (Figure 5).120 
Latin America1,205
DynCorp International has the global infrastructure to provide rapid response 









Figure 5.  DynCorp International global network 
 
B. ORIGINS OF DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL 
DynCorp International LLC has its origins with two 
companies created in 1946, Land-Air, Inc., and California 
Eastern Airways Land-Air, Inc., which became the predecessor 
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to DynCorp International's Maintenance and Technical Support 
Services (MTSS) Division. MTSS reached a major milestone in 
1951, when it was awarded the first Contract Field Teams 
(CFT) contract by the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). 
Contract field teams offer mission support and depot-level 
repair to U.S. military aircraft and weapons systems 
worldwide. DynCorp International and its predecessors 
continue to offer services under the CFT program 
continuously since being awarded that first contract.121 
Moreover in 1951, Land-Air, Inc. was acquired by 
California Eastern Airways, Inc. (later California Eastern 
Aviation, Inc.). In 1962, California Eastern Aviation, Inc., 
changed its name to Dynalectron Corporation, and in 1987, 
Dynalectron changed its name to DynCorp. In 1998, DynCorp 
created DynCorp Technical Services, Inc. (DTS), and 
transferred its existing aerospace and international-
division business—including contracts later held by DynCorp 
International—to the new DTS subsidiary. In December 2000, 
DynCorp formed DynCorp International LLC, and transferred 
all of its international business to the new entity. DynCorp 
Technical Services LLC continues to perform DynCorp’s 
domestic contracts.122 
In March 2003, DynCorp and its subsidiaries were 
acquired by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). DynCorp 
remained the parent of its existing subsidiaries, including 
DTS and DynCorp International LLC, and CSC became their last 
parent.123 
                     




In 2004, CSC made a strategic decision to separate 
itself from its non-core businesses, including security and 
aviation services. As part of that decision, CSC moved its 
aviation services business segment into a separate CSC 
subsidiary, DTS Aviation Services. The U.S. Government 
approved the transfer of government prime contracts that 
were part of this business to DTS Aviation Services on 
September 30, 2004. On December 12, 2004, DynCorp and CSC 
entered into an agreement to sell DynCorp International LLC, 
including its subsidiaries Dyn Marine Services LLC and DTS 
Aviation Services LLC, to DI Acquisition Corp, a partner of 
Veritas Capital Management. The transaction closed on 
February 11, 2005, and the buyer was renamed DynCorp 
International Inc. DynCorp International Inc. is the 
business parent of DynCorp International LLC.124 May 9, 2006 
saw an initial public offering (IPO)—the first sale of 
DynCorp's common shares to investors on a public stock 
exchange. The main purpose of the IPO was to raise capital 
for the corporation. They consummated an equity offering of 
25,000,000 shares of their Class A common stock, par value 
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C. DYNCORP CAPABILITIES 
In recent years, defense spending has been rising at 
the fastest pace since the 1980s. According to Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, approximately 300,000 military 
personnel are performing work that can be outsourced. 
DynCorp International (DI) has benefited from the U.S. 
government's increasing utilization of the private sector 
for critical functions. Typically, once these functions have 
been outsourced, they remain so. Many foreign governments, 
such as the United Kingdom and Australia, are following the 
lead of the United States, thereby providing more 
opportunities for DI. DynCorp International benefits from 
the decreasing size of the U.S. military and consequent need 
for outsourced services (Figure 7).126  
 
Figure 7.  Increasing government & DoD outsourcing  
 
                     
126 DynCorp 2006 Annual Report, 9.  
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DI provides government technical services and 
outsourced solutions to the customers. Their primary 
services are provided through their two core operating 
segments, International Technical Services (ITS) and Field 
Technical Services (FTS). ITS accounts for approximately 
two-thirds of the business and has been the fastest-growing 
segment, with revenues doubling from $600 million in fiscal 
2004 to over $1.2 billion in fiscal 2006. ITS provides 
services such as international policing and police training, 
drug eradication, peacekeeping support, and logistics 
support services. The FTS division constitutes approximately 
one-third of the business. It is DI’s historical core 
business and generates a steady stream of revenue and cash 
flows. FTS offers aviation services such as aircraft fleet 
maintenance, aviation ground equipment support, and ground 
vehicle maintenance (Figure 8).127 
International Services Maintenance & Technical Support Services Field 
FY06 Revenue: $1,264.6 million FY06 Revenue: $702.4 million
Law Enforcement & Security Counter-Drug Operations
Operations Management/Construction Management 
Contingency & Logistics Operations
Field Services 
Aviation & Maintenance Services
Contractor Logistics Support
 
Figure 8.  DynCorp International Services 
                     
127 DynCorp 2006 Annual Report, 4. 
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1. International Technical Services  
This operating segment offers the following services: 
• Law Enforcement Training. Their services in this area 
include international policing and police training, 
judicial support, immigration support and base 
operations. 
• International Narcotics Eradication. Their services 
include drug eradication and interdiction, and host 
nation pilot and crew training. 
• Contingency Services. They provide peace-keeping 
support, humanitarian relief, de-mining, worldwide 
contingency planning, and warehousing and heavy 
equipment inspections. They believe they have the 
ability to provide these services on a rapid response 
basis. 
• Logistics Support Services. They offer procurement, 
parts tracking, inventory and equipment maintenance, 
property control, data entry and mobile repair 
services. They believe that they are able to support 
the deployment of personnel and equipment on short 
notice. 
• Security Services. Their services include security for 
diplomats, personal protection, security system 
design, installation and operations and cultural 
training. Using a database of approximately 3,000 
qualified individuals, as of March 31, 2006, they have 
the ability to recruit and assemble large security 
contingents on short notice. 
• Military Facility Operations. They provide facility 
and equipment maintenance and control, civil, 
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electrical, and environmental and mechanical 
engineering, custodial and administrative services. 
• Infrastructure Development. Their services include 
infrastructure engineering and construction 
management. 
• Marine Services. Their services include ship 
logistics, range ship maintenance, communications 
services and oil spill response fleet operations. They 
provide these services for both government agencies 
and commercial customers. 
• Security Technology. Their services include 
installation, maintenance and upgrades of physical and 
software access control points and servers and 
development of security software, smart cards and 
biometrics for use by government agencies and 
commercial customers.128 
2. Key International Services Contracts 
Figure 9 gives information for the principal 
International Technical Services contracts:129 
                     
128 DynCorp 2006 Annual Report, 22. 
129 DynCorp Investor Presentation 2007, 9, http://ir.dyn-
intl.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194296&p=irol-irhome (accessed 05/24/2007). 
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Figure 9.  Key international services contracts 
 
3. Field Technical Services 
This operating segment offers the following services: 
Aviation Services and Operations. Their aviation 
services and operations include aircraft fleet maintenance, 
depot augmentation, aftermarket logistics support, aircrew 
services and training, ground equipment maintenance and 
modifications, quality control, Federal Aviation 
Administration certification, facilities and operations 
support, aircraft scheduling and flight planning and the 
provisioning of pilots, test pilots and flight crews. 
Services are provided from both main base locations and 
forward operating locations. 
Aviation Engineering. Their technicians design, 
manufacture and install aircraft modification programs for a 
Key International Services Contracts 
Estimated 
Value(3)   
Recompete 





Civilian Police Program Department of State  Feb. 1994/Feb. 2004 February 2009  $1.75 billion(1)  
International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Department of State  Jan. 1991/May 2005 October 2015  $810 million(2)  
War Reserve Material U.S. Air Force May 2000 December 2007  $493 million 
Forward Operating Locations U.S. Air Force March 2002 June 2007  $141 million 
Qatar Security  U.S. Army Aug. 1997/Feb. 2003 September 2007  $ 91 million 
Sudan  Department of State   May 2001 Not applicable  $ 30 million(1)  
(1)  
Indefinite delivery/Indefinite quantity contract. 
(2)  
Estimated value for the first three years of this ten-year contract through May 2015.  
(3)  
As of December 29, 2006. 
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broad range of weapons systems and, as of March 31, 2006, 
more than 70 engine types, updating entire fleets to 
mission-readiness status. They provide services such as 
engineering design, kit manufacturing and installation, 
field installations, configuration management, avionics 
upgrades, cockpit and fuselage redesign and technical data, 
drawings and manual revisions. 
Aviation Ground Equipment Support. Their services in 
this area include ground equipment support, maintenance and 
overhaul, modifications and upgrades, corrosion control, 
engine rebuilding, hydraulic and load testing and 
serviceability inspections. They provide these services 
worldwide and offer both short- and long-duration field 
teams. As of March 31, 2006, they employ over 850 mechanics, 
technicians and support personnel who perform depot level 
overhaul of ground support equipment for U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Coast Guard programs and provide depot-level ground support 
equipment support at 20 worldwide locations. 
Ground Vehicle Maintenance. Their ground vehicle 
maintenance services include vehicle maintenance, overhaul 
and corrosion control and scheduling and work flow 
management. They perform maintenance and overhaul on wheeled 
and tracked vehicles for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine 
Corps, in support of their pre-positioning programs. They 
also provide overall program management, logistics support, 




                     
130 DynCorp 2006 Annual Report, 23. 
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4. Key Maintenance and Technical Support Services 
Contracts 
Figure 10 gives information for the principal Field 
Technical Services contracts:131 
 
 
Figure 10. Key maintenance and technical support services 
contracts 
 
D.  FINANCIAL REVIEW 
Fiscal year 2006 was productive and exciting for 
DynCorp International Inc. They completed the 
first year as an independent company, and shortly 
after their fiscal year ended, they launched 
their initial public offering on the New York 
Stock Exchange, which enabled them to improve 
their capital structure and reduce their long-
                     
131 DynCorp Investor Presentation 2007, 13.  
Key Maintenance and Technical Support 
Services Contracts  
Estimated  Initial/Current Recompete  
Contract  Principal Customer Award Date Date  Value(3) 
Contract Field Teams  Department of Defense Oct. 1951/Oct. 1997 March 2008  $2.39 billion(1)  
Life Cycle Contractor  
Support U.S. Army and U.S. Navy August 2000 January 2010  $944 million 
Andrews Air Force Base  U.S. Air Force January 2001 December 2011  $337 million 
Columbus Air Force Base  U.S. Air Force Oct. 1998/July 2005 September 2012  $244 million 
Army Prepositioned  
Stocks  
Afloat  U.S. Army February 1999 February 2009  $218 million 
Holloman Air Force Base  U.S. Air Force September 1999 March 2007  $107 million 
Eglin Air Force Base  U.S. Air Force November 2002 November 2010  $ 80 million 
F/A-18  Kuwaiti Air Force(2)  Sept. 1997/Dec.2005 December 2010  $ 70 million 
California Department of  
Forestry  State of California January 2002 June 2007  $ 83 million 
(1)  Indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts. 
(2)  Reflects end user under the contract rather than the contract party. 
(3)  As of December 29, 2006. 
 72
term debt. They also finished the year with 
record revenue and growth in earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) (Figure 11 and Figure 12).132 
 
Figure 11. DynCorp International’s historical operating 
performance 
                     
132 DynCorp Investor Presentation 2007, 17-18. 
  
Historical Operating Performance 
Revenues EBITDA and Margin 




27.3% CAGR  
$1,214 
45.1% CAGR 
$918  $60  7.6% $755  
$584  6.0%  $34 $34 
4.9%  $23 4.5% 
4.0% 3.7% 
(1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  
FY2001  FY2002  FY2003  FY2004  FY2005  FY2006  FY2001  FY2002  FY2003  FY2004  FY2005  FY2006  
EBITDA EBITDA Margin  
Note:  The Company uses a 52-53 week fiscal year ending on the Friday closest to March 31.  
(1)52-week period ended March 28, 2003 and April 2, 2005.  Sum of predecessor and successor DynCorp International entities.  
Strong growth and expanding margins. 
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Current Year Operating Performance 
Revenues EBITDA and Margin 
$1,800 
$120.0 8.0% 
$1,600 $115.0 7.8% 
$110.0 $107.7 7.5% $1,400 
$105.0 7.3% 
$1,200 $521.9 $528.0 
$100.0 7.0% 7.0% $96.9 
$1,000 
$95.0 6.8% 6.8% 







$200 $70.0 5.5% 
$65.0 5.3% $-
First Nine Months FY '06 First Nine Months FY '07 $60.0 5.0% 
First Nine Months FY '06 First Nine Months FY '07 GS MTSS 
 
 
Figure 12. DynCorp 2006 operating performance 
 
During fiscal 2006, 53% of their revenue was derived 
from the Department of State and approximately 44% from the 
Department of Defense, with the balance from commercial 
customers and foreign governments. They currently have a 
broad business base comprised of 44 active contracts and 
more than 100 active task orders with different agencies of 
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Figure 13. Revenue breakdown 
 
In 2006, their revenue grew to $1.97 billion, up 2.4% 
from the prior fiscal year. ITS revenue increased 2.6% to 
$1.26 billion, or 64.3% of total revenues. The increase in 
ITS revenues was primarily driven by new contract work, 
including new business under their Air-Wing contract, and by 
hurricane relief efforts along the Gulf Coast. FTS revenues 
increased 2.1% to $703 million from the prior fiscal year. 
FTS revenues were primarily driven by increased aircraft 
modifications under the Life Cycle Contractor Support 
program. Adjusted EBITDA reached a record $156.1 million, an 
increase of 35.3% from the prior fiscal year. Operating 
  
Revenue Breakdown 
Revenue by Customer - FY 2006 Revenue by Region - FY 2006 
Other Navy  Other Europe  
3%  6%  Americas 4% Other DoD  
11% 3%  
Other Air  Middle United  Force  East States  11%  U.S. State 10% 36%  Dept. Afghanistan 53% 13% Army 
24%  Iraq 
26%  
Revenues = $2.0 Billion Revenues = $2.0 Billion 
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income was $101.2 million in fiscal 2006, up 47.7%, with 
operating margin increasing 150 basis points. The improved 
margin was largely driven by a contract mix containing a 
larger proportion of fixed-price and time-and-materials 
contracts, which carry higher margins. The strong fiscal 
2006 operating cash flow of $55.1 million contributed to 
improvements in their balance sheet and credit quality. They 
ended the year with cash and cash equivalents totaling $20.6 
million. Their backlog at fiscal year end was approximately 













Figure 14. Contracted backlog at fiscal year end 
(dollars in millions)  
 
They also track estimated remaining contract value, 
which they believe is a better indication of the aggregate 
revenue they expect to earn over the remaining life of their 
contracts. At fiscal year end, estimated remaining contract 
value totaled $8.9 billion, compared to $4.4 billion at the 
end of fiscal 2005 (Figure 15).135 
 
                     
134 DynCorp 2006 Annual Report, 8. 
135 Ibid., 4-5.  
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Figure 15. Backlog contract 
 
E. SUPPLY PUSH AND DEMAND PULL FACTORS IN TERMS OF 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS AND THE MAIN AREAS OF ACTION 
Each institution’s security needs are unique, so 
DynCorp International provides security by uniting the right 
mix of sophisticated technology with expert human decision. 
They use their physical security knowledge and up-to-date 
expertise to offer sophisticated personnel identification 
systems, biometrics, imaging, perimeter controls, personal 
protection, background checks, and other elements. These can 
be set up in any combination—at one site or networked  
 
Backlog by Contract Remaining Contract Value By Contract 
Other  LCCS  
6%  
Other CFT  12%  17% 3%  Columbus 




GLS CIVPOL  37% 9%  
INL 
27%  
CIVPOL  GLS 
16%  58% 
Total Backlog as of 12/29/06: $5.8 billion                   Estimated Remaining Contract Value as of 12/29/06: $8.9 billion 
    
Note:   Backlog represents remaining contract value.  For Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity, or IDIQ contracts, 
backlog represents only task orders awarded.  Estimated Remaining Contract Value is backlog plus management’s 
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worldwide. DynCorp International can deploy law enforcement 
and security personnel in a very short time.136 
They already protect facilities belonging to government 
and private industry in many parts of the world. DynCorp 
International’s security personnel are skilled, experienced, 
mature, and matched to the job—and are fully trained to work 
in other cultures. DynCorp International has been trusted 
with the fundamental work of helping to protect American 
diplomats and facilities overseas in high-threat areas. 
Their security experts have worked under the Department of 
State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Israel, and Iraq to help guarantee the safety 
of American diplomats and some foreign leaders.137 
1. The Balkans: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the end of 1995, illustrates 
the ethical and legal challenges involved with the industry. 
DynCorp helped with the so-called stabilization of the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton agreement. During that 
operation, two coworkers were implicated in sex scandals—
they bought, sold and abused children by using them as sex 
slaves. The victims were only 13 years old. The offenders 
were never officially charged, but rather were simply flown 
back to the U.S. by DynCorp. The occurrence did not damage 
the enterprise because the company was assigned to organize 
                     
136 DynCorp Official Website. 
137 Ibid. 
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the U.S.-American contingent of the Kosovo verification 
mission (KVM) in the autumn of 1998.138 
 After the war against Yugoslavia in 1999, DynCorp 
signed a contract for more than 628 million dollars for the 
training of the U.S. police force in the Kosovo. The U.S. 
Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement was at this time responsible for the U.S. 
CIVPOL program and had a budget of $10 million for Fiscal 
Year 2001 for developing a two-thousand-person CIVPOL cadre 
drawn primarily from municipal and state law enforcement 
agencies. The day-to-day administration of the program was 
subcontracted to DynCorp, which was responsible for 
recruiting, preparing, and supporting the mission's American 
officers chosen for deployment.139  
"We have extensive experience doing business for the 
military," said Spence Wickham, a retired U.S. Air Force 
officer who was a director of international operations in 
the division of DynCorp which was handling the Kosovo 
mission. He said the men were flying from Texas that day and 
would arrive in the region the next day. They included 
weapons inspectors, verification experts, and drivers and 
technicians to operate the standard U.S. infantry vehicle, 
the Humvee.140 
                     
138 Jurgen Elsaesser, “The Dogs of the War,” http://www.unikassel.de/ 
fb5/frieden/themen/Privatkriege/elsaesser.html (accessed 04/20/2007). 
139 Special Report, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr104.html (accessed 
04/20/2007). 
140 Jonathan Steele, “U.S. Gives Kosovo Monitoring Job to 
Mercenaries,” http://taf.ilim.ru/public/kosovo1.html (accessed 
04/21/2007). 
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Mr. Wickham believed it was the first time American 
private contractors had sent civilians to replace normal 
servicemen in combat areas where there was no formal 
ceasefire agreement. "But we've worked in Bosnia for over 
three years by contributing former military and police 
officers to the international police task force there," he 
said. The DynCorp bid triumphed over that of another 
company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated, which 
won two earlier contracts in the Balkans, though neither of 
them had experience with such a high-risk mission as 
Kosovo.141 
2. Plan Colombia 
After funding for Plan Colombia was approved in July 
2000, the U.S. Congress set a limit on the number of 
soldiers and civilian contractors who could “support” Plan 
Colombia. But in view of the “excellent” performance of the 
contractors, in May of the next year Washington decided to 
increase the number of U.S. soldiers in the country from 400 
to 500 and to eliminate any limit on the number of private 
contractors. This quantitative jump in U.S. involvement in 
Colombia was completely clear.142 
Without media awareness or public inspection, the Bush 
Administration has not only embraced but extended Clinton's 
Plan Colombia by applying it beyond that war-torn nation's 
borders. Given an increase as the Andean Regional Initiative 
                     
141 Jonathan Steele, “U.S. Gives Kosovo Monitoring Job to 
Mercenaries,” http://taf.ilim.ru/public/kosovo1.html (accessed 
04/21/2007). 
142 “The ’Invisible’ U.S. War in Colombia,” 
http://www.spectrezine.org/war/Secretwar.htm (accessed 04/22/2007). 
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(a.k.a. the Andean Initiative), the program aimed to 
strengthen military and police capabilities from Bolivia to 
Panama, in the name of drug abolition and prohibition. While 
supposedly focused on drugs, the $750 million of military 
hardware deployed via Plan Colombia was used completely 
against leftist insurgencies and the farmers that lived in 
the territories they controlled.143 
At least six U.S. military-specialty companies have set 
up operations in the region, according to U.S. military 
sources. Two Virginia-based companies—DynCorp Inc. and 
Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI)—operated under  
contracts related to logistical support and training of 
Colombian police and counterinsurgency forces.144 The 
contractors sterilized coca fields, operated airplanes and 
helicopters for the State Department, arranged programs of 
alternative development, fixed aircraft and assessed 
intelligence information for the Colombian Ministry of 
Defense. This U.S. mini-army also supplied pilots, 
technicians and almost every kind of personnel required to 
wage the war in Colombia, including administrative 
personnel. DynCorp Aerospace Technologies had contracts with 
more than 37 federal agencies comprising more than 98 
percent of its business. In 2001 the company signed a $600 
million contract with the State Department for coca 
fumigation operations in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.145 In 
the Plan Colombia contract, the company has 88 airplanes and 
307 employees—139 of them American—flying missions to get 
                     
143 “Plan Colombia and Andean Initiative,” http://eatthestate.org/05-
23/PlanColumbiaAndean.htm (accessed 04/22/2007). 
144 Ibid. 
145 “The ’Invisible’ U.S. War in Colombia.”  
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rid of coca fields in Colombia.146 DynCorp has a sufficient 
record of operations around the world. In Colombia, 
according to Peter Singer, the company's employees have 
received a reputation of “arrogance and an inclination to 
fight.”147 
3. Afghanistan 
In Afghanistan, where DynCorp used to guard President 
Hamid Karzai, the company had a reputation for brutality and 
recklessness, including serious complaints from 
internationals of threats. It has even been reprimanded by 
the State Department for its "aggressive behavior" in 
interactions with European diplomats, NATO forces and 
journalists.148 
There have been several reported cases of apparently 
overzealous and insensitive behavior on the part of Mr. 
Karzai's private security contractors. A BBC correspondent 
recently saw one of the guards slap an Afghan minister. 
Crispin Thorold reported seeing the Afghan transport 
minister receive a slap from one of Mr. Karzai's security 
guards on a visit to the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif.149 
Despite these issues, DynCorp International was chosen 
by the U.S. Department of State to support the substantial 
American contribution to that effort, with the goal of 
                     
146 “DynCorp Rent-a-Cops May Head to Post Saddam Iraq,” 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=6328 (accessed 04/22/2007). 
147 “The ’Invisible‘ U.S. War in Colombia.” 
148 Scahill, “Tender Mercenaries: DynCorp and Me,” 
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/1101-25.htm (accessed 04/23/2007). 
149 “Afghanistan: DynCorp Guards Chastised by U.S. State Department,” 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11574 (accessed 04/23/2007). 
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increasing police presence, improving public security, and 
supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Under the 
direction of the Department of State, DynCorp cooperated 
with the Afghanistan National Police, Border Police, and 
Highway Patrol, focusing on basic skills training for 
existing police and basic training for lower-ranked police, 
and they supplied assistance in reforming and equipping the 
police. Afghan police obtained both general police training 
and training that was specific to their policing 
specialty.150 
4. Iraq 
Similar to Afghanistan, DynCorp is providing the 
training of police officers in Iraq. The Company has 
provided this service since April 2004 under the Department 
of State’s worldwide Civilian Police Program. On September 
5, 2006 The United States Department of State awarded 
DynCorp International a nine-month extension of its task 
order to support the training of police officers in Iraq. 
This extension was valued at more than $318 million and will 
expire on May 31, 2007.151 
DynCorp International police advisers were assigned to 
the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT), the 
component of the U.S. military’s Multinational Security 
Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) responsible for the 
U.S.-led effort to train and equip the 135,000-member Iraqi 
police service. DynCorp International was responsible for 
                     
150 DynCorp Official Website. 
151 Ibid. 
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recruiting, training, equipping, and sustaining the 700-
member U.S. contingent of trainers.152 
Finally, the DynCorp team won the Iraq interpreter 
deal. Global Linguistic Solutions, a joint venture between 
DynCorp and McNeil Technologies, has won a five-year; $4.6-
billion contract to provide linguistic services for the U.S. 
Army and other government agencies in Iraq. 
Awarded by the Army’s Intelligence and Security 
Command, the contract saw GLS providing foreign language 
interpretation and translation services, including the 
embedding of Iraqi translators with U.S. units. GLS planned 
to employ up to 6,000 locally-hired translators and up to 
1,000 U.S. citizens with security clearances who were native 
speakers of languages spoken in Iraq. The effort is being 
lead by GLS president (and retired U.S. Army Major General) 
James “Spider” Marks, assisted by Michael Simone. James 
Marks was responsible for the Iraq Language Program in 2003, 
while Simone was a former commander of the Defense Language 
Institute. GLS began the contract in March 2007 after the 
existing contract with L-3 Communications expired. New York-
based L-3 Communications assumed the contract in July 2005 
with its acquisition of Titan Corp. Titan held the contract 
for translation and interpreter services for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and for 
the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.153 
 
                     
152 DynCorp Official Website. 
153 “DynCorp Team Wins Iraq Interpreter Deal,” 
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5. USA 
In the United States DynCorp is in charge of the border 
posts between the U.S. and Mexico and many of the Pentagon's 
weapons-testing ranges, and the complete Air Force One fleet 
of presidential planes and helicopters. The company also 
appraised security clearance applications for military and 
civilian personnel from the Navy.154 Under previous 
ownership, DI was precluded from competing in domestic U.S. 
markets. Now they can apply their core international 
competencies in the U.S. (Figure 16).155  
 
Figure 16. Domestic growth opportunities  
                     
154 “DynCorp Rent-a-Cops May Head to Post Saddam Iraq.” 
155 DynCorp Investor Presentation 2007, 14. 
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F. DYNCORP COMPETITORS 
1. Blackwater 
Chapter III describes Blackwater more thoroughly. As a 
brief recap: Blackwater was founded in 1997 by Erik Prince 
and is based in North Carolina. The company describes itself 
as a "military, law enforcement, security, peacekeeping, and 
stability operations company." Blackwater is one of over 60 
private security firms employed during the Iraq War to guard 
officials and installations, train Iraq's new army and 
police, and provide other support for occupation forces.156 
2. Vinnell Corporation 
Vinnell Corporation began operations for a variety of 
government and other customers during the Great Depression, 
on 5 continents and in over 50 countries. Its specialties 
are facilities operation and maintenance, military training, 
and logistics support. The company is known as a leader in 
offered services for its customers. The record of the 
company’s achievements shows that it has reacted effectively 
and efficiently in order to meet the needs of its 
customers.157 
Moreover, the Vinnell Corporation has been successful 
for almost three decades in providing training and support 
to international military forces. The main services that the 
company offers are: 
                     
156 “Blackwater USA,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackwater_USA 
(accessed 04/25/2007). 
157 Vinnel Corporation Official Website, http://www.vinnell.com/ 
(accessed 04/25/2007). 
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• Training, from the individual soldier to command and 
staff training of senior military officers 
• Logistical and maintenance support from unit to 
depot level 
• Fielding and supporting major weapon systems 
• Tactical training from squad to brigade level 
• Force-on-force exercises, including the Multiple 
Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES).158 
3.  Omega Services  
Omega Services, based in Russia, was founded by former 
military personnel from the Russian Naval Omega PDSS group 
(combat frogmen-saboteurs). They are experts in providing 
specialized hardware and personnel with highly professional 
operational and tactical skills, and they supply their 
services for government state forces, international and non-
governmental organizations as well as business corporations. 
They also serve as advisors in training government 
militaries. The members of the company are retired officers, 
SPN VMF (Russian Naval Specnaz) and Russian Marines.159 
The company supports its government’s own armed forces 
in the following fields: 
• operational support 
• advisory  
• training 
Omega is still looking for a long-term cooperation with 
similar companies around the world in different spheres of 
                     
158 Vinnel Corporation Official Website. 
159 Omega Services Official Website, http://omega.warfare.ru/ 
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its activities. As a politically oriented company, Omega 
Services provide and support Russia’s state interest and 
state foreign policy worldwide.160 
G. STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE 
What are the DynCorp prospects for the future? What 
factors are driving them?  
According to Andrew Michels, the former peacekeeping 
operations and humanitarian affairs director of DynCorp: 
DynCorp’s prospects for the future in the 
security area will depend very much on the way in 
which it is successful in convincing the U.S. 
government to allow private contractors to 
continue to operate in the security area.  There 
are a number of people in the policy world, 
including myself, who believe that my 
government’s outsourcing of security functions 
especially armed security functions has exceeded 
upper governance.   That is to say there are now 
people under the DynCorp employment umbrella who 
are operating in conflict zones and they in some 
ways become part of the conflict and I think 
that’s a very bad idea for public policy. And 
there are a number of people in the government in 
both the executive and legislative branch who 
agree with my point of view. One school of 
thought will say that DynCorp will continue to 
have a very successful security business because 
the world is becoming, especially for Americans, 
an increasingly hazardous place. This is 
especially in the world where gas and oil are 
very concerned. Gas and oil are found in areas of 
high conflict and as a consequence security is 
needed to safeguard persons and installations. 
That’s the private sphere. In the public sphere, 
I think it’s an open question as to whether or 
not DynCorp, and companies like it, for example 
Armored Group, Triple Canopy and some of the 
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others like it in the UK will continue to work 
for the governments in the west in the way that 
they have in the past. So, one thing you know the 
conflict in Afghanistan, the conflict in Iraq it 
will look very different in three to four years. 
As the conflicts change and the US presence in 
these countries diminishes so too will private 
security operators. I think it’s a mixed picture. 
And I rather suspect DynCorp’s opportunities will 
increasingly be found in the private sector 
rather than public sector contracts.161 
The other area of possible actions in the future for 
DynCorp may be United Nations Organizations in terms of 
humanitarian relief, natural disasters and support 
operations. 
Moreover, DynCorp is actively pursuing new business 
beyond the Department of State and Department of Defense, 
and has been successful in both the U.S. and foreign 
markets. One example is their project to build a new airport 
in Nigeria’s Akwa Ibom State. This three-phase Greenfield 
project has a potential total value of $350 million. After 
the three years of construction, DI will have a 26-year 
concession to operate the only maintenance, repair, and 
overhaul facility in West Africa, as well as to operate the 
air-cargo facility. The Akwa Ibom International Airport will 
be a private commercial venture with facilities to handle 
wide-body aircraft, regional air cargo, and major aircraft 
repair and maintenance. The construction project is a 
public/private partnership between DI and Akwa Ibom State. 
It will be one of the first privately funded and operated  
 
                     
161 Personal Interview with Andrew Michels, The former peacekeeping 
operations and humanitarian affairs director of DynCorp. 
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airports in Africa, and will use the latest in technology 
and design to meet the rapidly-growing needs of West and 
Central Africa. 
In the domestic market, DI worked directly with FEMA 
and local government to provide security and logistics 
support following Hurricane Katrina. Shortly after the 
hurricane, they established living and working facilities, 
communications, food service, and transportation for the 
critical employees of St. Bernard Parish, which was almost 
completely inundated and had suffered the loss of nearly all 
its structures. Using their extensive police recruiting 
infrastructure, they also recruited licensed law enforcement 
officers who were deputized by the St. Bernard Parish 
sheriff to provide security for hospitals and other private 
facilities. DI is in an excellent position to gain new 
business awards in both of these new markets.162 
H. CONCLUSION 
DynCorp is one of the oldest—if not the oldest—private 
security companies. It didn’t begin its life as a security 
company. It began some 50 years ago. It was born to service 
the U.S. military in respect to aviation assets, and 
continues to provide technical assistance to the armed 
forces for mechanics on airplanes. Only later did DynCorp 
move into the security field. It expanded into other fields 
as well including technology, narcotics eradication and the 
area that Andrew Michels used to direct (peacekeeping and 
humanitarian affairs). So DynCorp, like most businesses 
                     
162 DynCorp 2006 Annual Report, 16.  
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keeps its eye out for new opportunities and areas of growth 
and expansion and will try to compete in those fields.  
According to Andrew Michels: 
For example, in the peacekeeping area DynCorp was 
not at all in the peacekeeping business in the 
year 2001 when I was hired by DynCorp and I was 
hired to develop the business and we won major 
contracts and when I left, we had already I think 
grown the business to $150 million dollars. So, 
that’s the kind of evolution the company’s been 
on. It’s been fairly as we would say perhaps 
fairly opportunistic in looking for and pursuing 
new opportunities to work with the U.S. Federal 
Government.163 
DI’s competitive advantage is, first of all, its long-
standing and strong customer relationships, among others 
with The State Department and Department of Defense, and 
also its reputation and experience in the military market. 
The chart of DI’s services is very broad and this is one of 
the keys to success because in this way the company gains 
new customers and can expand the network of connections and 
contracts. Throughout the organization, they have employees 
with significant industry experience, which is especially 
important in their relationship-driven industry. They have 
a highly efficient global recruiting network that finds 
skilled professionals and technicians worldwide. 
As an independent company, they are free to apply the 
many competencies they have gained in support of the 
military to the domestic market. 
Given the strong outlook for the industry, there are 
many growth opportunities before them and they are well-
                     
163 Personal Interview with Andrew Michels. 
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positioned for future growth. DI currently anticipates 
revenue growth in excess of 20%, from a combination of 
existing programs and new programs in both the United States 
and abroad. They believe their CIVPOL and Air-Wing programs 
will be the major forces behind growth in the existing 
programs.164 
                     
164 DynCorp 2006 Annual Report, 5. 
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V. SO WHAT? WHAT MIGHT THE FUTURE BRING? FUTURE 
PROJECTIONS ABOUT THE USAGE AND ROLES OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY COMPANIES 
A. WHAT MAY THE FUTURE BRING? 
As long as war exists, so will a demand for military 
expertise. Private Military Firms (PMFs) will resultantly 
benefit from any slack given by traditional sources of 
security. The overall history of public versus private 
military actors indicates that the privatized military 
industry will continue to play a significant and increasing 
role in international security in the next decades. The 
simple reason is that the very same structure conditions 
that led to the industry’s original growth still appear to 
be in place. Additionally, the trend toward worldwide 
privatization seems to indicate that the marketing of 
military services will continue to be a growth industry for 
the foreseeable future. 
The supply of private security forces and the demand 
for them are growing by leaps and bounds. Trying to 
eliminate them is like trying to eliminate prostitution, 
said Herbert Howe, a professor at Georgetown University's 
School of Foreign Service.165 
There are many variables in the future that will affect 
the future of the Private Security Sector. These are: 
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• Changing nature of warfare 
• Privatization 
• Growing military technology 
• Failed states in the future and U.N. regulation 
• Worldwide increasing number of multinational 
corporations 
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES THAT SEEM TO AFFECT THE FUTURE OF 
PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR INTRODUCTION 
1. Changing Nature of War  
After the end of the Cold War, nearly everything 
started to change except the nature of change itself. The 
nature of war and conflict also has been affected from that 
change. 
Post Cold War conflicts have become contests between 
powerful armies and inferior forces that use violent and 
nonviolent means meant to wear down, rather than defeat 
opponents. Some analysts contend that the age of Western 
military superiority has ended. For example, in Iraq, the 
U.S., the world’s only superpower, finds itself in a 
prolonged conflict with an inferior enemy force; Israel’s 
campaign in southern Lebanon last summer is a similar case. 
Another example: after decades of failed attempts by Arab 
states to fight Israel with conventional armies built on the 





with a new strategy. It blends violent and non-violent means 
intended to exhaust, not defeat a superior military 
force.166  
Max Boot, a Senior Fellow for National Security Studies 
at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, says the 
West is losing the battle in the war on terrorism to 
adversaries that are as agile as they are cunning.  
Our enemies are very nimble, very networked, very 
quick to adapt. They are able to run this global 
insurgency with command and control, propaganda, 
recruiting, financing—so many elements depending 
on this new technology.  
We are having a hard time keeping up. What we 
have been seeing is the limits of the 
conventional military and conventional 
government, which is not adapted to the kind of 
challenge that we face today.167 
He contends that U.S. armed forces are burdened with a 
bureaucratic structure that worked well in the Cold War, but 
not today. He says one way to transform the Pentagon is to 
further outsource its operations.168  
Intelligence of the battlefield or enemy in all lines 
also in the near future increasingly will be available on 
the open market, which will create a market niche for PSCs. 
Commercial satellites already are providing high-resolution 
images for sale. 
Due to the rapid changes of war, in the future the 
private sector will be able to rapidly tailor a custom 
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solution to solve the customer’s problem by using the 
database they are keeping for all solutions from all over 
the world. A case can be made that their ability to quickly 
react with a right-sized solution, in which the entire cost 
is only associated with the duration of the contract, might 
be cost effective and result oriented. 
2. Future Trend of Privatization of Military 
Capabilities 
The private security business is “a growth industry par 
excellence worldwide” and one of the fastest growing 
economic sectors in many countries; this trend will continue 
to increase in the future decade. Today private security 
personnel within Britain actually outnumber the British 
Army. Even in communist China some 250,000 guards are 
employed by the private security industry.169 As one 
observer opined “if privatization is the trend in these 
days, the argument goes, why not privatize war too?” 
According to Pelton, “The idea of outsourcing 
traditional military tasks is a part of the surge mentality 
that was formed after the Cold War.  If you had a task, like 
Somalia or Bosnia, you don't want to build the military 
operation and keep paying those people for 20 or 40 years, 
so you outsource it. This is supposed to be a short-term, 
one time need.”    
If the revolution in military affairs continues along 
its current route and military forces become smaller, more 
technology reliant, and less dependent on individuals with 
high levels of physical fitness and the ability to face 
                     
169 Singer, “Corporate Warriors,” 139. 
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physical danger, private militaries will become even more 
competitive with state ones. If a warrior fights from a 
computer terminal using computer viruses and the like, 
states will contract out national security rather than 
undertake the expense of forming and sustaining armed 
forces. 
Due to the growing technology, usage of unmanned 
aircraft increased tremendously after the Cold War in all 
aspects of warfare (intelligence, bombing, etc.) Together 
with that, it is quite possible that unmanned aircraft 
technology (“piloting” of military aircrafts for DoD 
purposes) will be outsourced in the near future. 
A parallel trend is underway in the world of 
intelligence. In the U.S. and Western Europe, private 
intelligence companies are proliferating. The massive 
expansion of information and the growth of the Internet are 
making open-source intelligence of all kinds nearly as good 
for most purposes as traditional intelligence. National 
armed forces might thus, ironically, make themselves more 
redundant by enhancing their capabilities. 
3. Growing Military Technology  
Except for the western armies few militaries in the 
developing world have high professional standards and many 
are hampered by politicization, poor management and lack of 
civilian oversight. Many states also use the military as an 
employment program to take in the uneducated, illiterate, or 
sickly. Training levels are very low as well. For example,  
In most African Armies, indiscipline, economic 
problems and laxity in management have relegated 
training to the back seat. It is not unusual to 
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find entire brigades who have not fired a rifle 
since their basic training. The result is that in 
the near future even if they are able to buy 
sophisticated equipment, many developing state 
militaries simply lack the skilled personnel to 
operate and maintain it.170  
So long as the instability of those states seems to 
continue, no further development will be achieved in the 
fighting, training and education of these armies. This will 
increase the trend of using PSCs, especially in those Third 
World countries.   
Mozambique for example possesses 43 fighter jets, 6 
helicopter gunships, and 12 naval vessels, but it has so 
poorly maintained them that it doesn’t have one boat that 
floats or one plane that flies.171 
As one defense analyst put it “We are using the most 
advanced technology in the history of the world to wage wars 
and sometimes the people who built it are the only ones who 
know how to fix it.”172  
Due to the challenges inherent in the nature of 
warfare, the technology also will continue to grow to fight 
with those challenges. This growth will increase the number 
of private companies operating on the battlefield alongside 
the conventional soldiers of states.  
 
 
                     




C. FUTURE PROJECTIONS ABOUT THE USAGE AND ROLES OF 
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 
In an interview Robert Young Pelton, the author of 
“Licensed to Kill”, says:  
 There is no indication that the military and 
intelligence community has any incentive to 
reduce their reliance on the private sector. Erik 
Prince of Blackwater has already announced his 
1,740 man private army. It comes complete with 
gun ships, fighter-bombers, armored vehicles, and 
intelligence. He calls it “Relief with Teeth” and 
is hoping that the United States or the United 
Nations will hire his army to buttress or even 
replace intervention and stability operations. 
Prince's biggest customer is the U.S. government, 
and he is careful not to jeopardize that 
relationship, but the war on terror has created a 
massive labor pool of combat-hardened 
professionals who have a much higher monetary 
value in the private sector with guns in their 
hands. There have been examples—like the coup 
attempt in Equatorial Guinea—in which investors, 
contractors, and mercenaries tried to effect 
“regime change” with naked self-interest in mind. 
So if an investor or world leader wants to hire 
his own proxy army, this new, informal and 
massive “old boys’ network” can provide them the 
capability.173  
So in what business lines may the Private Contractors 
operate in the near future? 
1. Military Training and Assistance 
Military training and assistance will keep on growing 
as a trend in the future due to the fact of continuance of 
downsizing of many western militaries and poor training 
levels of newly emerged states. U.S.-based Private Military 
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Contractors started to train foreign armies with MPRI during 
the collapse of Yugoslavia by training Croats against 
Serbian forces. Later, as mentioned in Ch. III, Blackwater 
trained up to 50,000 Navy sailors after the suicide bombing 
of the Norfolk-based U.S.S. Cole. 
Because of the increasing demand for military training 
many PMCs give on their Web page the address and location of 
international training as “any location on the planet.” 
     One of the most important reasons for the upward trend 
in demand for international training may be the newly 
emerged post Cold War states with no armed forces like 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia, etc., and failed states such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Rwanda. 
2. Humanitarian Disaster Relief and UN Peacekeeping 
Operations 
Disorder has increased since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall; the Cold War has been replaced with many small hot 
wars. In response to these conflicts many people started to 
ask how to make the United Nations better at international 
policing than it currently is. The answer may be to 
privatize forces providing peacekeeping and security with 
U.N. oversight. The U.N. may hire private organizations to 
build military forces specifically tailored to each mission. 
The combination of an increasingly unsafe and 
difficult humanitarian environment and the rise of new 
marketized military capabilities has led some to call for a 
twenty-first century business solution to the twenty-first 
century’s human security problems. If everything from 
prisons to welfare has been privatized, goes the reasoning, 
why not the protection and provision of humanitarian 
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assistance? There are also, however, some surprising voices 
raised in its support, driven primarily by frustration at 
the international failure to take prompt action in places 
like Rwanda, and the sorry experiences of peacekeeping in 
Somalia, Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As 
General Ian Douglas, a former U.N. mission commander in 
Sierra Leone, put it: ”In a perfect world, we would not 
need them or want them…But the world is not perfect.”174 
Prior to the genocide in Rwanda, Executive Outcomes 
(EO) was contacted by the U.N. for possible use. Lafras 
Luitingh, a former chief executive officer of the company, 
estimated that a force of 1,500 EO personnel could save up 
to 200,000 lives.175 The UN decided not to pursue that 
option, or any option for that matter, and disastrous 
consequences ensued: estimates are that over 800,000 
Rwandans were massacred. 
     Perhaps Hurricane Katrina also gave a lot of future 
market niche to many PMCs related with disaster relief 
operations. 
     “The Red Cross has just announced a new disaster-
response partnership with Wal-Mart. When the next hurricane 
hits, it will be a co-production of Big Aid and Big Box. 
This, apparently, is the lesson learned from the 
government’s calamitous response to Hurricane Katrina:  
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Businesses do disaster better.” This is how Naomi Klein 
describes privatization of disaster relief.176 
     Some future market niches for PMCs for humanitarian 
relief operations might be in the areas of: 
• Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations after 
Tsunamis in the Indian Ocean area, in countries like 
Indonesia and the Philippines. 
• Establishing and operating Early Warning systems 
against Tsunamis in the Indian Ocean and Polynesian 
Islands. 
• Earthquake Relief Operations around the world. 
• Operating private Federal Emergency Management Agencies 
around the world. 
• Producing ‘Disaster Evaluation Plans’, and 
establishment & operation  of ‘Crisis Management 
Centers’ all over the world especially in metropolises 
like New York, Tokyo, Istanbul and London.  
• Manpower and material support to international 
organizations like the Red Cross, Red Crescent and 
NGOs. 
• Debris Removal after disasters like Katrina and the 
Istanbul Earthquake. 
• Renting mobile homes to disaster areas. 
3. Military Intelligence Gathering 
While military contracting for construction or weapons 
manufacturing is nothing new, the privatization of 
                     




intelligence instruction is a new and rapidly expanding 
sector that came about less than six years ago. One estimate 
in Mother Jones magazine, compiled from interviews with 
military experts, suggests that up to 50 percent of the $40 
billion given annually to the 15 intelligence agencies in 
the United States is now spent on private contractors. 
For instance, Virginia-based Anteon International Corp. 
has grown tenfold in the last decade. The company has become 
one of the U.S.’s primary contractors for intelligence 
sharing, intelligence training and videogame warfare 
simulators. Although Anteon first came into existence in 
1976, its profits began to soar 20 years later, when former 
investment banker Frederick Iseman bought the company’s 
assets for a mere $48 million. Today, Anteon’s annual 
revenues exceed a billion dollars and its share price has 
jumped from its initial public offering of $18 to $36 in the 
last three years.177  
Today the company holds a master contract to teach a 
wide variety of courses for the Initial Entry Training (IET) 
in the U.S. Army’s intelligence school: ranging from the 
basic course which is titled 96B, to the more specialized 
Advanced Individual Training (AIT) courses such as counter-
intelligence training, interrogation, signals intelligence, 
electronic intelligence and signal identification. 
Traditionally, these IET and AIT jobs were handled by 
two battalions of conventional military intelligence brigade 
troops; today the tasks of teaching—from drawing up the 
                     
177  Pratap Chatterjee, “Intelligence Inc., Military Interrogation 
Training Gets Privatized” http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11940 
(accessed 5/20/2007). 
 104
curriculum to the final exams for the students—still take 
place on the military base, but often are conducted by 
instructors from the private companies. 
4. Manufacturing and Service 
Private Military Companies, with the experience they 
have gained from war zones, may offer new weapons and 
armored personnel carriers and other equipment that are 
compatible with the requirements of the “21st century 
battlefield”. One of the clear examples of that trend is, as 
has been described in Ch. III, Blackwater’s introduction of 
the “Grizzly” armored personnel vehicle. Blackwater touts 
the Grizzly on its official Web site: “The leader in the 
high-threat security industry, Blackwater incorporates real-
world lessons learned on the streets of Iraq and Afghanistan 
into all of our operations. Now, we’ve gone one step 
further. Blackwater presents the GRIZZLY – the world’s only 
Armored Personnel Carrier intended to counter the most 
lethal threats in the modern urban combat environment. 
On the same note, these companies may provide 
maintenance and spare part supply to armed forces of any 
country that is not new. 
5. Providing Infrastructure Security and Executive 
Protection 
As has been explained in detail above, the threat after 
the end of the Cold War is asymmetric, and the biggest 
threat to international corporations is terrorist attacks. 
The inferiority of insurgents leads them to wear down their 
enemies rather than taking them on directly. This situation 
created a huge market niche for Private Security Companies. 
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Figure 17 gives an idea of how rapidly the security 
cost of investment has increased. With the invasion of Iraq 
it was almost 7% and then increased to 10%; then, after the 
Fallujah incident, security cost in Iraq jumped to 20%. 
 
2003       2004       2007 
Figure 17. The security cost of investment in Iraq 
 
Thinking about security cost is the first priority for 
international corporations—like BP in Central Asia and the 
Caspian Sea region—operating and investing in instable 
places of the world. 
Also, suicide attacks or assassinations of the 
executives of these international companies will continue to 
grow as part of the ‘wearing down strategy’. Based upon that 
trend, the executive protection market for Fortune 500 
companies will also continue to grow. 
In addition to these market niches, maritime and port 
security all over the world (especially for China and India 
due to the fact that they are the biggest exporters) is a 
large potential market. 
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D. FOUR KEY MEASURES FOR DEVELOPING THE EFFECTIVE AND 
EFFICIENT USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY ARMIES 
1. Transparency on the Accounting Side  
Lift the veil of secrecy that surrounds the industry.  
The client must exercise its rights by undertaking a 
comprehensive survey to finally figure out the full scope of 
what it has outsourced and what the results have been. It 
seems also that in the very near future transparency and 
accountability of Private Military Firms will be mandated by 
accepting certain regulations from Congress. According to 
Scott Horton, Project Consultant of Accountability for 
Private Military Contractors, in a very short time many 
regulations will be introduced by Congress to provide both 
transparency and accountability.178 
2. Standards on Outsourcing and Privatization 
     It must be determined what roles and functions should 
be privatized and which would not be in the best interests 
of national security and the public.  
A lesson of the general outsourcing and privatization 
in other fields, from cities’ privatizing garbage collection 
to Cisco’s outsourcing its router production, is that the 
privatization can be greatly beneficial, up to the point 
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3. Oversight Capacity  
It seems self-evident, but is ignored all too often: 
privatize something only if it will save you money or raise 
quality. If it won’t, then don’t.  
In theory, privatization can be greatly beneficial, but 
that theory is frequently directly undermined either by a 
misunderstanding of the assumptions that are included in it 
or by the manner in which it is carried out. That something 
is private does not make it inherently better, quicker or 
cheaper. Rather, it is through following the free-market 
mechanisms that one gets better private results. If the task 
is put up for competition on the open market so as to get 
the best price, the firm is able to specialize, the client 
is then a careful steward of the process, able to provide 
oversight and management to guard its own interests. The 
firm is therefore properly motivated through the terms of 
the contract and a fear of being fired, meaning success can 
be achieved. Too often, though, the government forgets these 
simple lessons and rather than getting the best of 
privatization, it obtains the worst of monopolization.179  
According to Representative Henry Waxman of Los 
Angeles, even though it is so hard and costly to oversee 
Private Military firms, oversight capacity of related 
organizations like GAO and host countries will be increased 
both functionally and legally in the very near term.180 
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4. Legal Accountability  
Action must be taken on the issue of legal 
accountability. In an ideal arrangement, states will 
coordinate their efforts and attempt to involve regional 




























VI.  CONCLUSION 
A.  SUMMARY 
The increase in private security can be tied to supply 
and demand. In the 1990s, the supply factors came from both 
local (the end of apartheid in South Africa) and 
international (the end of the Cold War) phenomena that 
caused militaries to be downsized in the late 80s and early 
90s. Military downsizing led to a flood of experienced 
personnel available for contracting. Connected with the 
increase in supply was an increase in the demand for 
military skills on the private market—from western states 
that had downsized their militaries, from countries seeking 
to upgrade and westernize their militaries as a way of 
demonstrating credentials for entry into western 
institutions, from rulers of weak or failed states no longer 
propped up by superpower patrons, and from non-state actors 
such as private firms, INGOs, and groups of citizens in the 
territories of weak or failed states. 
There are those who assume that the turn to Private 
Military Firms was the obvious, natural, and functional 
response to the material changes technology brought to 
warfare and the shift in the balance of power after the Cold 
War.181 The privatized military industry is no mere fiction. 
Private companies are not only operating in warfare today, 
but are, in fact, essential to many military operations. 
PMFs have been operating on the global scene for more than a 
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decade now and have reached new summits in their growth as a 
result of the Iraq war. In looking at their fundamental 
causes, the forces that drove this growth seem set in 
place.182  
Arguments about the future of defense in the U.S. 
illustrate this thinking. The United States, as the sole 
remaining superpower, must accomplish a variety of 
international needs. It must leap ahead technologically, 
search for the next peer competitor, and maintain the 
capacity to keep some degree of order in a variety of 
important, but less than vital arenas.183 Maintaining 
stability includes combating illegal by-products of 
globalization such as organized crime, drugs, and terrorism, 
as well as enforcing emerging global norms about human 
rights and encouraging the democratic institutions that are 
seen as supporting such norms.184  
Much like the Internet boom, one can expect many of the 
firms that currently profit from conflicts in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and other war zones to downsize if these 
conflicts cool down, but the overall industry is expected to 
be here to stay. 
B.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further study, research, and policy implementation is 
needed in many areas, because there are many controversies 
related to accountability, legitimacy, transparency and 
                     
182 Peter W. Singer, “The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What 
Have We Learned and Where To Next?” 22. 
183 Nye and Owens, 20-36. 
184 H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, The Illicit Global Economy 
and State Power (New York: Roman and Littlefield, 1999). 
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ethical issues of PMF use. These are compelling issues 
because after the end of the Cold War the private security 
business throve, and citizens are allowed and obligated to 
be informed about those matters.  
Abuses are common in the military or private sector, 
but the consequences are quite different. An abuse by the 
military may cause an international incident and shame a 
nation, but in the case of PMFs a contractor would simply be 
fired and his employer criticized. The increasing reliance 
on the private sector removes many of responsibilities that 
would be expected from the military and creates extensive 
opportunities for scenarios that could seriously endanger a 
mission. There are numerous examples of financial, moral and 
legal abuse of the contractor system—overcharging, running 
local scams and committing criminal activity. Private 
contractors can operate well outside of the media radar, and 
thus without the knowledge of the U.S. taxpayers or the 
majority of Congress. These problems result from poor 
governmental oversight of an exploding industry. It also 
limits transparency by putting so much information in so 
many different areas.  
As a result, there are a couple of questions that must 
be asked:  
“In what ways can the government increase the oversight 
and improve the transparency of PMF contracts?”  
“What rules and values must be implemented by the U.S 
State Department and Department of Defense in hiring the 
private contractors?”      
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“Why don’t the CEOs of Private Military Firms directly 
take responsibility for human rights violations on the same 
level as they bear the responsibility for the financial 
control and environmental issues?”  
“How does the change of the legislative rules and 
international laws and regulations affect the future of 
PMFs?”  
These are some of the suggested research questions and 
topics that might be conducted when continuing research of 
the private military industry.  
 Researchers in this field often lack comprehensive 
information on the industry. The following contacts 
contributed their knowledge to the research for this report 
and they are willing to cooperate with future students who 
are interested in Private Military Firms: 
• Christopher Davis (Assistant to Representative Henry 
Waxman), Christopher.Davis@mail.house.gov  
• Peter W. Singer, Foreign Policy Studies Director of the 
Brookings Institute and author of “Corporate Warriors: 
The Rise of The Privatized Military Industry,” 
PSINGER@brookings.edu   
• Jeremy Scahill, an independent journalist, author of 
Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful 
Mercenary Army, jeremy.scahill@gmail.com 
• Andy Michels, ex-director peacekeeping operations and 
humanitarian affairs, DynCorp International, 
amichels@interlocutor.net 
• Scott Horton, Professor  of Law of Colombia University, 
and also project consultant—accountability for private 
military contractors, Shorton99@aol.com  
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• Joe Mayo, member of EODT and ex-employee of 
Triple Canopy, joe.mayo@yahoo.com 
• Joseph Neff, journalist of News Observer   
jneff@newsobserver.com 
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